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SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING
OR INCREMENTAL CHANGE?
by
Kathryn L. Moore
In light of Social Security's long-term deficit, reform of the system
appears inevitable. Commentators and policymakers have offered a wide
range of possible reforms. This Article describes and analyzes five
possible types of reform: (1) individual accounts, (2) progressive price
indexing, (3) general revenue and/or estate tax revenue financing, (4)
increasing the maximum taxable wage base, and (5) increasing the
normal retirement. The Article opposes the first two proposed changes,
individual accounts and progressive price indexing, because they would
fundamentally restructure the current system. The Article recommends
that Social Security's financing difficulties be addressed by a
combination of estate tax revenue financing, a higher taxable wage base,
and a higher normal retirement age. A combination of these three
reforms would retain the current structure of the system and distribute
the costs of reform so that no single class of participants or beneficiaries
would bear the entire brunt of reform.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the American Social Security system has a surplus of over $1.8
trillion, and that surplus is expected to grow to just under $4 trillion by the
beginning of 2015.1 The system's long-term financial future, however, is less
sanguine. The Social Security Board of Trustees projects2 that by 2017, the
Social Security system will begin to collect less in contributions than it owes in
benefits, and by 2040,3 the Trust Fund will be exhausted.4 At that point in time,
absent an intervening change in the law, the system will only be able to pay
I U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., THE 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE
TRUST FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No. 109-103, at 2 (2006), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf. [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL REPORT] (using
intermediate assumptions). These figures refer to the combined assets of the OASI (Old Age
and Survivors' Insurance) and the DI (Disability Insurance) Trust Funds.
2 In their annual report, the Board of Trustees uses three different sets of assumptions,
(1) intermediate, (2) low cost, and (3) high cost. The intermediate assumptions reflect "the
Trustees' best estimate of future possibilities," and thus the projections set forth in the text
are based on their intermediate assumptions. Id. at 6.
3 Although little attention is paid to this date, it is worth noting that the Social Security
program's interest income is projected to more than offset the shortfall in non-interest
income until 2027. Id. at 50.
4 Id. at 2.
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74% of promised annual benefits, and by 2080, the system will only be able to
pay 70% of promised annual benefits.5
In light of this sobering forecast, virtually all lawmakers and
commentators agree that the system must be reformed. Agreement, however,
ends there. Policymakers and analysts have offered widely divergent proposals
to reform the Social Security system. Some, such as President Bush and the
Cato Institute, contend that the current system is fundamentally unsound and
should be fundamentally restructured by directing some Social Security
contributions to individual accounts. Others believe that the system's basic
structure is sound and only incremental reforms, such as increasing the taxable
wage base and/or increasing the normal retirement age, are necessary to bring
the system within actuarial balance. Finally, other experts have proposed
reforms that would modify the current system's structure but not as profoundly
as would the individual account proposals.
This Article provides an overview of the wide range of possible ways to
reform Social Security.6 Many reform proposals, particularly those that would
bring Social Security into actuarial balance, or close actuarial balance, include
a variety of changes. 7 Rather than attempt to describe and analyze the multitude
of specific proposals, this Article describes and analyzes the principle types of
possible changes.
8
The Article begins by analyzing individual account proposals, the reform
that would most fundamentally change the current Social Security system. It
' Id. at 8.
6 For additional studies of the range of options, see, for example, Virginia P. Reno &
Joni Lavery, Nat'l Acad. of Soc. Ins., Options to Balance Social Security Funds Over the
Next 75 Years (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.nasi.org/usr doc/SSBrief_18.pdf.;
Cong. Budget Office, Projected Effects of Various Provisions on Social Security's Financial
and Distributional Outcomes (May 25, 2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
63xx/doc6377/Social_Security_Menu-CBO baseline.pdf; Craig Copeland, Comparing
Social Security Reform Options, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF (Employee Benefit Research Inst.,
Washington, D.C.), May 2005, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0505ib.pdf.;
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING
PROGRAM SOLVENCY (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98033.pdf.
7 See, e.g., Robert M. Ball, The Social Security Protection Plan: How We Can Cope-
Calmly-With the System's Long-Term Shortfall (Jan. 2006), http://zfacts.com/metaPage/
lib/Ball-2006-SSProtectionPlan.pdf (proposing three-part plan to bring Social Security into
close actuarial balance); NANCY J. ALTMAN, THE BATTLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: FROM
FDR's VISION TO BUSH'S GAMBLE 299-301 (2005) (endorsing Ball's proposal); PETER A.
DIAMOND & PETER R. ORSZAG, SAVING SOCIAL SECURITY 79-98 (2004) (offering different
three-part plan); HENRY J. AARON & ROBERT D. REISCHAUER, COUNTDOWN TO REFORM 96-
114 (1998) (proposing plan with seven different elements).
8 The Article can not, and does not, attempt to describe every possible type of reform.
For example, the Article does not address proposals to invest the assets of the Social Security
trust fund in the private market. For an analysis of such a proposal, see, for example, U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING: IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT
STOCK INVESTING FOR THE TRUST FUND, THE FEDERAL BUDGET, AND THE ECONOMY (1998),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/a398074.pdf.
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then discusses Robert Pozen's recent progressive price indexing proposal, 9
which on its face might appear to simply modify current benefits, but would in
fact, if implemented for a long enough period of time, significantly change the
structure of the current Social Security system. It then turns to proposals to
introduce a new source of funding for Social Security, such as long-serving
former Social Security commissioner Robert Ball's proposal to fund some of
Social Security's long-term deficit with the estate tax. Finally, the Article
reviews proposals to increase the current payroll tax and/or decrease benefits.
II. INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS
In recent years, a number of lawmakers and analysts have proposed that
the Social Security system be amended to include individual accounts.
10
Although the specific details of the proposals vary widely, they all have one
common effect: they would fundamentally transform the current Social
Security system.
This section begins by providing an overview of the proposals. It then
explains how individual accounts would fundamentally transform the Social
Security system. It then explains why this type of reform would do little to
solve Social Security's long-term deficit. Finally, it concludes with my
recommendation as to whether individual accounts should be adopted.
A. The Proposals
Over the last decade or so, there have been a multitude of proposals to
amend the Social Security system to add individual accounts. The specific
9 "Progressive price indexing" is the term Pozen used to describe his proposal.
Undoubtedly, Pozen used the term "progressive" to describe his proposal because of its
political appeal. The proposal is "progressive" in that benefits are not reduced for the lowest
paid. A critic of the proposal, however, may prefer to describe it with a more "neutral" term
such as "combined wage and price indexing." This Article will refer to the proposal as the
"progressive price indexing" proposal because it is the term that is used by its creator. See
Senator Max Baucus, Statement at the Hearing Before the Senate Finance Committee on
Proposals That Achieve Sustainable Solvency, With and Without Personal Accounts (Apr.
26, 2005), available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/statements/042605mb.pdf
(Senator Max Baucus refers to Pozen's proposal as "progressive price indexing"); see also
Robert C. Pozen, Chairman, MFS Investment Mgrnt., Statement at the Hearing Before the
House Ways and Means Committee on Alternatives to Strengthen Social Security (May 12,
2005), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=3203
(where Pozen testifies about his "progressive indexing" proposal).
10 See, e.g., White House, Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century (Feb.
2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security/200501/
strengtheningsocialsecurity.pdf, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC.,
STRENGTHENING SOCIAL SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS
11 (2001), available at http://www.csss.gov/reports/Final-Report.pdf (proposing three
different models); U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., REPORT OF THE 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
SOCIAL SECURITY, VOL. I: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STATEMENTS 28-30 (1997),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/adcouncil/report/findings.htm (proposing
two different plans).
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details of the proposals vary widely. For example, some proposals would "add"
individual accounts on to the current Social Security system. 1 Others would
"carve" such accounts out of the current system. 12 Some proposals would fund
the accounts with contributions of as little as 1.6% of covered payroll.' 3 Others
would fund the accounts with as much as 5% of covered payroll. 14 Some would
severely limit individual investment choice,1 5 while others would allow
participants wide latitude in investment choice.
16
Despite the diversity in specific details, the proposals share a number of
common elements. First, the proposals typically require, or sometimes just
permit,' 7 all workers (or all workers under a certain age) to contribute some
percentage of their Social Security contributions to an individual account and
invest those contributions in one or more private funds. The proposals then
provide two tiers of benefits. The first tier may provide all workers with a flat
benefit, regardless of their earnings. Or, the first tier may provide workers with
a benefit that is related to earnings, as is the current Social Security benefit. The
first tier benefit is typically lower than the current Social Security benefit to
reflect the diversion of contributions to the individual account. 18 The second
tier benefit then consists of the contributions to the account plus or minus any
earnings or losses on those contributions.
B. How Individual Accounts Would Fundamentally Transform Social Security
Under the current Social Security system, workers are promised a benefit
based on a complex benefit formula that takes into account the worker's
earnings over a thirty-five-year period. 19 Participants have no ownership or
control over their contributions to the system. Instead, their benefits are
determined entirely by the applicable benefit formula.
Under a system of individual accounts, in contrast, each worker's
contributions are placed in an individual account which the worker holds and
1 For example, the 1994-1996 Advisory Council's Individual Account Plan would
"add on" individual accounts by funding them with a mandatory additional 1.6 payroll tax.
U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 10, at 28.
12 For example, the 1994-1996 Advisory Council's Personal Security Account Plan
would "carve" individual accounts out of the current system by diverting five percent of the
current payroll tax to fund them. Id. at 30.
13 See, e.g., id. at 28 (Individual Account Plan).
14 See, e.g., id. at 30 (Personal Security Account Plan).
15 See, e.g., id. at 28 (Individual Account Plan).
16 See, e.g., id. at 30 (Personal Security Account Plan).
17 See Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Top Ten Myths of Social Security Reform, 13 ELDER L. J.
309, 332 (2005) (noting that one of President Bush's core reform principles is that
participation be voluntary).
18 Under the "add on" approach, new money is used to fund the individual accounts and
thus current benefits need not be reduced to replace diverted contributions. See Regina T.
Jefferson, Privatization: Not the Answer for Social Security Reform, 58 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1287, 1300 (2001).
'9 42 U.S.C. § 415 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of how benefits are
calculated, see Section III.A infra.
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manages. The worker's second tier benefit is not based on a predetermined
formula. Instead, the second tier benefit consists of the worker's contributions
and any earnings or losses on those contributions. Proponents of individual
accounts argue that one of their principal advantages is that they would give
workers ownership and control over their retirement funds.
20
In a private White House memo, Peter Wehner, President Bush's Director
of Strategic Initiatives, explained:
As you know, our advocacy for personal accounts is tied to our
commitment to an Ownership Society-one in which more people will
own their health care plans and have the confidence of owning a piece of
their retirement. Our goal is to provide a path to greater opportunity,
more freedom, and more control for individuals over their own lives.
That is what the personal account debate is fundamentally about-and it
is clearly the crucial new conservative idea in the history of the Social
Security debate.2'
The current Social Security system is a system of social insurance. Ownership
and individual control play no role in social insurance. Rather, solidarity and
collective action lie at the core of social insurance. If Social Security were
transformed into a system of individual ownership and control, it would "rank
as one of the most significant conservative governing achievements ever. The
scope and scale of this endeavor are hard to overestimate.
'"2 3
C. Effect of Individual Accounts on Social Security's Long-Term Deficit
In recent years, proponents of individual accounts have begun to concede
24
what economists have long known. 2 5 Individual accounts, standing alone, can
not solve Social Security's long-term deficit. This is because individual
accounts can not and do not address the most significant reason underlying
Social Security's long-term deficit, what Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag refer
20 See, e.g., White House, supra note 10, at 5; Michael Tanner, Cato Inst., Keep the
Cap: Why a Tax Increase Will Not Save Social Security (June 8, 2005),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp93.pdf; see also June E. O'Neill, Why Social Security
Needs Fundamental Reform, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 79, 80 (2004) (a system of individual accounts
"would give individuals ownership of a significant component of their own pension assets,
offering greater flexibility and more options").
21 Memorandum from Peter H. Wehner, Presidential Director of Strategic Initiatives,
Some Thoughts on Social Security (Jan. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/etheridge.WhiteHouseMemo.pdf.
22 See Kathryn L. Moore, President Bush 's Personal Retirement Accounts: Saving or
Dismantling Social Security, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIN-2005 ch. 5, § 5.06, at 23 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2005).
23 Memorandum from Peter H. Wehner, supra note 21.
24 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 22, § 5.02, at 6 (discussing 2005 White House memo to
conservative allies that concedes that individual accounts alone cannot solve Social
Security's long-term financing difficulties).
25 Brown et al., supra note 17, at 321.
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to as the system's "legacy cost" or "legacy debt." 26 This legacy cost arises from
the fact that Social Security, like most social insurance systems, paid the first
generations of retirees far more than their contributions to the system could
finance. 7 As Robert Ball has explained:
Financing the old-age and survivors insurance program presents
difficulties largely because persons retiring in the first 5, 10, 15, or even
20 years of the program cannot be expected to contribute at a high
enough rate to accumulate a sum that would provide reasonably adequate
benefits. Yet for sound social reasons we are not willing to postpone
adequate payments under the social insurance program to the time when
the amounts accumulated would cover the cost of such payments.
28
According to calculations by economists John Geanakoplos, Olivia
Mitchell, and Stephen Zeldes, as a group, the Social Security beneficiaries born
before 1937 received about $10 trillion more in benefits than the economic
value of their contributions to the system.29 The creation of individual accounts
simply cannot eliminate that debt. "To restore the system to long-run financial
balance, some generation must see its consumption reduced, either through
higher taxes or through lower Social Security benefits than are currently
scheduled. 30
D. Recommendation
I recommend that the Social Security system not be amended to include
individual accounts. First, individual accounts would not solve Social
Security's long-term deficit. More importantly, as I have argued at length
elsewhere, 3' they would fundamentally change the nature of the system and
would be the first step toward dismantling it.
32
26 DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 7, at 6-7; see also Moore, supra note 22, § 5.02, at
7-11 (discussing three factors that contribute significantly to Social Security's long-term
deficit: (1) increasing life expectancy, (2) the fact that the baby boom generation is reaching
retirement age and followed by a much smaller generation, and (3) the legacy debt).
27 See ROBERT M. BALL, INSURING THE ESSENTIALS: BOB BALL ON SOCIAL SECURITY
210 (Thomas N. Bethell ed., 2000) ("Most social insurance programs also give to the
workers retiring in the early years of the program benefits that are much greater than can be
bought by the contributions paid for their age group. This was true of the old-age benefit
program under the original Social Security Act, passed in 1935; and in the 1939
amendments, older workers were given even larger benefits in relation to their
contributions.").
28 See id. at 210.
29 John Geanakoplos et al., Would a Privatized Social Security System Really Pay a
Higher Rate of Return?, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES, POLITICS AND
ECONOMICS 137, 146 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998).
30 See Brown et al., supra note 17, at 321-22.
31 See generally Moore, supra note 22.
32 For additional critiques of individual account proposals, see Kathryn L. Moore,
Partial Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effect on Women, Minorities, and
Lower-Income Workers, 65 Mo. L. REV. 341 (2000); Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution
Under a Partially Privatized Social Security System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 969 (1998);
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III. PROGRESSIVE PRICE INDEXING
33
Under current law, initial Social Security benefits are wage indexed. Once
initial benefits are calculated, benefits are then price indexed each year. Robert
Pozen, an investment executive and member of President Bush's 2001
Commission to Strengthen Social Security, has proposed that the Social
Security benefit formula be amended to provide for indexing under a
progressive price indexing formula. 34 Under this proposal, initial benefits for
low-wage workers would be wage indexed while benefits for high-wage
workers would be price indexed and benefits for average-wage workers would
be partially wage indexed and partially price indexed.
At first blush, this proposal might appear simply to modify the current
benefit formula and not have a significant impact on the fundamental structure
of the Social Security system. In fact, however, if the proposal were
implemented for a long enough period of time, it would in effect convert the
current system which offers wage-related benefits to a flat benefit system.
35
This section begins by explaining how benefits are calculated under the
current Social Security system. It then explains the difference between price
indexing and wage indexing and describes Pozen's progressive price indexing
plan in more detail. It then analyzes the costs and benefits of progressive price
indexing. Finally, it concludes with my recommendation as to whether
progressive price indexing should be implemented.
Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 TEMP. L. REV.
131 (1998) [hereinafter Moore, Misguided Reform].
33 This section is based on section 8.02[2] of Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security Reform
in 2005 and Beyond, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2006 ch. 8 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2006) (Copyright 2006
LexisNexis Matthew Bender).
34 Pozen's progressive price indexing plan is part of a broader proposal that includes
individual investment accounts. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss, Chief Actuary, U.S.
Soc. Sec. Admin., to Bob Pozen, Estimated Financial Effects of a Comprehensive Social
Security Reform Proposal Including Progressive Price Indexing (Feb. 10, 2005), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency/RPozen_20050210.pdf. (describing the Pozen plan).
The plan, however, can stand on its own and need not be linked with private accounts. See
Pozen, supra note 9. President Bush has endorsed the proposal. Elizabeth White, Bush Again
Calls for Private Accounts, Endorses "Progressive Price Indexing, " 32 BNA PENSION &
BENEFITS REP. 1008 (2005) (noting that Bush endorsed progressive price indexing in "a
nationally televised news conference" on April 28, 2005).
35 Memorandum from Patrick Purcell, Specialist in Social Legislation, Cong. Research
Serv., to Senate Fin. Comm., "Progressive Price Indexing" of Social Security Benefits (April
22, 2005), available at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/RetirementSecurity
/CRSPriceIndexing_04-22-05.pdf. ("Under the method of progressive price indexing
analyzed by SSA and described in this memorandum, all workers eventually would be paid
the same monthly benefit .... CRS estimates that this would occur approximately 100 years
following the implementation of progressive price indexing as described by SSA, assuming
long-run real wage growth of 1.1% per year.").
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A. Calculating Benefits Under the Current Social Security System
In order to calculate initial benefits under the current Social Security
system, workers' earnings 36 are indexed by multiplying each year's wage by an
indexing factor equal to the ratio of the average national wage in the year the
worker turns 60 to the average national wage in the year to be indexed.3 7 For
administrative ease, wages earned at age 60 or later are left at their nominal
values in the indexing process.38 Average adjusted earnings, or "average
indexed monthly earnings" ("AIME"), are then calculated by taking the best 35
years of earnings adjusted for past wage inflation, adding them together and
dividing them by 420 (the number of months in 35 years).
Average adjusted earnings are then multiplied by a progressive benefit
formula to determine the worker's primary insurance amount (PIA). 4' The
formula replaces a higher percentage of average adjusted earnings the lower
one's average earnings so that the ratio of benefits to average earnings is higher
for those with low average earnings than for those with high average earnings.
The benefit percentages (90%, 32%, and 15% remain the same each year,
while the dollar amounts, or "bend points, are increased by the rate of
growth of the national average wage.43 For those reaching age sixty-two in
2006, the formula replaces 90% of the first $656 of AIME, plus 32% of AIME
between $656 and $3,955, plus 15% of AIME above $3,779.44
By indexing earnings and adjusting the bend points each year for increases
in the national average wage, the current Social Security system ensures that
benefits for each generation of workers grow at the same rate as their wages
grow, and the replacement rate, that is, initial benefits as a percentage of
workers' career-average earnings, remains constant.45 The Social Security
36 Earnings are only taken into account to the extent that they are at or below the
maximum taxable wage base. See Section V.A for a discussion of the taxable wage base. Of
course, only earnings of workers covered by the Social Security program are taken into
account. Currently, the Social Security program covers about 96 percent of the American
workforce. See U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL
SECURITY BULLETIN, 2005, at 13 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/
statcomps/supplement/2005/supplementO5.pdf.
3' 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3) (2000).
38 "Earnings are indexed only up to age 60 because it can take up to two years for the
national earnings data on which the wage indexing series is based to become available."
Memorandum from Patrick Purcell, supra note 35, at 2 n.4.
39 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1).
40 42 U.S.C. § 415(a).
4' 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A).
42 "The amounts at which the PIA factors change are called bendpoints because when
the PIA factors are graphed against the AIME, the graph appears as three lines joined at
these points." Memorandum from Patrick Purcell, supra note 35, at 3 n.5.
43 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(B)(ii).
44 Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2006, 70 Fed. Reg. 61,677
(Oct. 25, 2005) (establishing bend points for 2006).
45 See Memorandum from Patrick Purcell, supra note 35, at 2 ("Under current law,
benefits for each generation of workers grow at the same rate as their wages grow.
Consequently, (1) the purchasing power of benefits rises from one generation of workers to
2007]
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Administration has estimated the replacement rate for low-wage workers to be
55%, for average-wage workers to be 41%, and for high-wage workers who
have always earned the annual maximum taxable wage to be 27%.46
Once initial benefits are calculated, they are adjusted for increases in the
47consumer price index; that is, they are price indexed. Price indexing ensures
that initial benefits do not decline in value asprices increase over time and that
the retiree's buying power remains the same.
B. Price Indexing Versus Wage Indexing
In 2001, President Bush's Commission to Strengthen Social Security
proposed three alternative plans for reforming Social Security. 49 Model 2, the
model considered the most likely to resolve permanently Social Security's
funding deficit, included, among other changes, a shift from wage indexing to
price indexing.50 Specifically, Model 2 proposed that, beginning in 2009, each
year the PIA factors (90%, 32%, and 15%) be multiplied by the ratio of the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) to the Average Wage Index in successive years
while, earnings and the bend points remain indexed for wage growth.51 Due to
increases in worker productivity, wages tend to rise faster than prices, and price
indexing is expected to cause the PIA factors to decrease and the Social
Security replacement rates to fall over time.
52
To illustrate, suppose that in one year prices grow by 2.8% while wages
grow by 3.9%, the long-term rates of growth projected by the Social Security
Administration. 53 Based on these figures, each of the PIA factors would be
multiplied by 1.028/1.039, or 0.989, that year. Assuming the Social Security
Administration's projections are accurate and the long-term rate of price
growth is 2.8% and wage growth is 3.9%, after seventy-five years of
multiplying the PIA factors by this ratio of price growth to wage growth, the
the next, and (2) the replacement rate-initial benefits as a percentage of workers' career-
average earnings-remains constant for each successive generation of workers.").
46 Id. at 5.
4' 42 USC § 415(i).
48 Memorandum from Patrick Purcell, supra note 35, at 1 ("Once enrolled in the
program, beneficiaries' Social Security checks increase each year at the same rate as the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) so that they do not decline in value as prices rise over time; i.e.,
they are price indexed."); Am. Acad. of Actuaries, Social Security Reform: Changes to the
Benefit Formula and Taxation of Benefits 3 (Apr. 2004), http://www.actuary.org/
pdf/socialsecurity/benefit_04.pdf ("Indexing benefits to changes in the CPI helps ensure that
the buying power of Social Security benefits remains the same after a worker begins
receiving benefits.").
49 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 10.
o Id. at 119.
51 Id. at 120 n.39. For a discussion of alternative price indexing models and their effect
on benefits and solvency of the Social Security system, see Andrew G. Biggs et al.,
Alternative Methods of Price Indexing Social Security: Implications for Benefits and System
Financing (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11406, 2005).
52 Memorandum from Patrick Purcell, supra note 35, at 6.
53 See 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note I, at 85-86 (intermediate assumptions).
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factors would fall from 90%, 32% and 15% to 40.5%, 14.4%, and 6.7%
respectively. 54 Moreover, all three PIA factors would continue to fall into the
indefinite future. Based on these projections, the replacement rate for an
average-wage earner would fall from 39% under current law to 16% in 2080
under a price indexed system.
56
Because price indexing would decrease benefits so drastically, it is
expected to more than restore solvency to the Social Security system.
Specifically, the Social Security Administration projects that price indexing
benefits would cut benefits by 2.07% of taxable Xayrol157 while the current
projected shortfall is only 2.02% of taxable payroll.
C. Progressive Price Indexing
Recognizing that over time price indexing could substantially reduce
benefits and have a particularly adverse effect on low-income workers,
59
Robert Pozen proposed a progressive price indexing plan that would be
effective for all those becoming eligible for benefits in 2012 or later.60 This
plan would be implemented through a three-step process. The first step would
be to compute the percentage benefit reduction that would apply for a worker
who had earned the maximum taxable wage throughout the worker's career if
all three of the PIA factors (90%, 32%, and 15%) were fully price indexed.6 1
Next, a new "bend point" in the Social Security PIA formula would be created
for low-wage workers, which would be defined as workers with career earnings
at or below the 30th percentile of earnings, and benefits at or below this new
54 Memorandum from Patrick Purcell, supra note 35, at 6.
55 Id.
56 Id. The replacement rate for an average-wage earner is expected to fall from 42%
today to 39% in 2080 because the normal retirement age is scheduled to increase from 66 to
67 under current law. Id.
57 Id.
58 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
59 In testimony before the Ways and Means Committee, Pozen described the rationale
for his proposal as follows:
I believe that when Social Security was passed, there were no Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRA) or 401(k)s; there weren't really even very many defined benefit plans.
Now, in 2004 alone, the tax revenue foregone for IRAs and 401(k)s was roughly $55
billion; if we include all private retirement programs, it was $100 billion in that year
alone. Most of those tax subsidies go to high-wage and to some degree middle-wage
workers, and so, I believe in order to create neutral government support among wage
groups, we need to do more for low-wage workers in Social Security. Very few of them
have retirement programs like 401(k)s or IRAs and they are totally dependent on Social
Security.
Pozen, supra note 9.
60 For a detailed description of the plan, see Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss,
supra note 34, at 2.
61 Id. ("Begin by computing the percentage benefit reduction that would apply for the
highest career-average earner becoming eligible for a retired worker benefit in each year
2012 and later based on CPI-indexing the PIA formula (as specified in Model 2 of the
President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security).")
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62
bend point would continue to be wage indexed. Finally, the third step of the
process would be to calculate the percentage reduction to the PIA factors above
the new bend point (32% and 15%) that would result in the same benefit
reduction for workers who earned the maximum taxable wage throughout their
career as would have applied if price indexing had applied to all workers.
63
Application of this three-step process would result in reducing benefits for
workers who have earned the maximum taxable wage base throughout their
careers by the same percentage as they would have been reduced if the benefit
formula were fully price indexed for all workers at all earnings level. 64 It would
reduce benefits by a smaller percentage for workers who have earned average
wages throughout their careers, and it would not reduce benefits at all for
workers with earnings at or below the 30th percentile of career-average
earnings. 65 Thus, using current figures, workers who earn the taxable
maximum-$94,200 in 200666-over their lifetime would have their benefits
calculated using price indexing, while workers at or below the 30th percentile
of career-average earnings-about $20,000 today 67-would have their benefits
calculated under the current formula, and those earning between $20,000 and
$94,200 would receive a benefit somewhere between the benefit provided
under current law and that provided under price indexing.
D. Costs and Benefits ofProgressive Price Indexing
Without a doubt, the greatest advantage of Pozen's progressive price
indexing plan is its potential to reduce Social Security's long-term deficit.
According to Social Security Administration projections, this proposal "would
reduce [Social Security's] deficit by 1.4% of taxable payroll, or about 74% of
the [then] estimated 75-year deficit of 1.9% 68 of taxable payroll.' 69 A second
62 Id. ("Then create a new 'bend point' in the Social Security PIA formula at the level
of the career-average earnings of the retiree at the 30th percentile of those becoming eligible
for benefits in 2010, and wage index this bend point forward like the two current bend
points. This new bend point is estimated to be 28.6 percent of the way up from the current
first bend point to the current second bend point.").
63 Id. ("Calculate the percentage reduction to the 'PIA factors' (32 and 15) that applies
beyond the new PIA bend point that will provide the benefit reduction described above for
the 'maximum' earner reaching retirement eligibility for each year 2012 and later.").
64 Id. ("This proposal would replicate benefit reductions for the very highest career
average earners that are provided under a CPI-indexed benefit formula.")
65 Id. ("Benefit levels would be reduced to a lesser extent for workers with lower
career-average earnings, with no reduction for those at or below the 30th percentile of
career-average earnings (AIME).").
66 See Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2006, 70 Fed. Reg. 61,677
(Oct. 25, 2005) (setting maximum taxable wage for 2006 at $94,200).
67 See Alicia H. Munnell & Mauricio Soto, Ctr. for Retirement Research at Boston
Coll., What is Progressive Price Indexing? 2 (Apr. 2005), http://www.bc.edu/centers
/crr/dummy/facts/jtfil 7.pdf (describing "the bottom 30 percent of workers" as those making
less than about $20,000 today).
68 In their 2006 report, the Social Security Board of Trustees revised the estimated
deficit to 2.02% of taxable payroll. U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 2. The increase
from 1.92% to 2.02% of taxable payroll is attributable to two factors: 1) the fact that the
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advantage of the proposal is that it would protect the benefits of low-wage
workers, who rely most heavily on Social Security for their retirement
income.
7 1
The plan, however, would not be costless. First, it would reduce the
benefits of average- and high-wage workers. For example, according to
calculations by Patrick Purcell of the Congressional Research Service,
assuming the Social Security Administration's predictions of price and wage
growth of 2.8% per year and 3.9% per year are accurate, high-wage workers
would receive a benefit cut of 17.4% and average-wage workers would receive
a benefit cut of 13.3% by the year 2030. Using the same assumptions, by the
year 2055, high-wage workers would receive a benefit cut of 36.7% and
average-wage workers would receive a benefit cut of 28%, 73 and by the year
2080, high-wage workers would receive a benefit cut of 51.5% and average-
wage workers would receive a benefit cut of 39.3%.74 Moreover, if real wages
were to grow faster, benefit cuts would be even deeper.
75
Second, by reducing the benefits for high- and average-wage workers
while retaining the wage-adjusted growth of benefits for low-wage workers,
progressive price indexing would necessarily flatten the Social Security benefit.
For example, according to Jason Furman of the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, in 2045, a high-wage worker, defined as a worker with earnings 60%
above those of the average worker, would only receive a benefit that was 20%
projection period moved forward to include a year with a large deficit, and 2) the fact that
the assumed long-term interest rate was reduced from 3.0 to 2.9%, which increases the
projected present value of projected deficits later in the 75 year valuation period. Alicia H.
Munnell, Ctr. for Retirement Research at Boston Coll., Social Security's Financial Outlook:
The 2006 Update in Perspective (Apr. 2006), http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/issues/
ib_46F.pdf.
69 Memorandum from Patrick Purcell, supra note 35, at 8. See also Pozen, supra note 9
("[Progressive indexing] alone closes 70 percent of the long-term deficit of Social Security,
going from $3.8 trillion to $1.1 trillion .... ); Thomas N. Bethell, Future Shock.- Is the
Latest Social Security Proposal for Indexing Benefits 'Progressive' or a Body Blow to the
Middle Class?, AARP BULL. ONLINE, June 2005, http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/socialsec/
futureshock.html ("Bush touts his plan as a responsible way to restore Social Security to
long-term solvency, claiming it would close about 70 percent of the anticipated shortfall,
though some of these savings come from cutting disability and survivors benefits.
(Protecting the disabled means the Bush-Pozen plan would close only 59 percent of the
gap.)").
70 Munnell & Soto, supra note 67, at 4 ("Progressive price indexing has the advantage
of protecting the benefits of low earnings workers. These workers would be assured of
receiving the same amount relative to previous earnings as they do today.")
71 U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., INCOME OF THE AGED CHARTBOOK 2002, at 22 (2004),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/income-aged/2002/iacO2.pdf
(showing that Social Security benefits represent 83% of aggregate income for elderly
persons in the lowest quintile of income).
72 Memorandum from Patrick Purcell, supra note 35, at 11 tbl. 1.
71 Id. at 12 tbl.2.
74 Id. For additional discussion of estimates, see Jason Furman, Ctr. on Budget &
Policy Priorities, An Analysis of Using "Progressive Price Indexing" to Set Social Security
Benefits (May 2, 2005), http://www.cbpp.org/3-21-05socsec.pdf.
75 Memorandum from Patrick Purcell, supra note 35, at 9.
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higher than that of an average wage worker, and by 2075, the high-wage
worker's benefit would only be 7% higher than that of the average wage
worker. 76
Moreover, if implemented for a long enough period of time, progressive
price indexing would, in effect, eliminate Social Security's progressive benefit
formula because all workers with earnings above the second bend point
(representing the 30th percentile of earnings) would receive the same flat
benefit. The leveling of benefits would result from the fact that the PIA factors
applied to the two higher earnings brackets would eventually be reduced to
zero. According to Purcell's estimates, assuming long-run real wage growth of
1.1% per year, it would take about 100 years of progressive price indexing for
the PIA factors for the two higher brackets to reach zero. 77 Thus, according to
Furman, by 2100, the majority of workers would receive a benefit of $22,500
per year, which would only replace 9% of pre-retirement earnings for a worker
who earns the maximum taxable wage throughout his or her career.
78
By flattening benefits, progressive price indexing threatens to undermine
public support for the Social Security system.79 As Robert Ball, who served as
Commissioner of Social Security under three Presidents, has said:
[Progressive price indexing] really changes the entire philosophy of
Social Security. Instead of partially replacing a worker's earnings, it
gradually becomes a welfare program paying the same flat benefit to
everyone-while protecting only the poorest 30 percent. I can't imagine
people continuing to support it, once they realize that the more they
contribute, the less they'll get.
80
E. Recommendation
On the whole, I do not support progressive price indexing. While I agree
with Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag that Social Security reform should
include a combination of revenue increases and benefit reductions, I do not
believe that progressive price indexing is the best form of benefit reduction.
First and foremost, I find it objectionable because of its potential to transform
the Social Security system into a flat benefit program. Social Security has
76 Furman, supra note 74, at 6.
77 Memorandum from Patrick Purcell, supra note 35, at 10.
78 Furman, supra note 74, at 6.
79 See Nat'l Comm. to Preserve Soc. Sec. & Medicare, Viewpoint-Social Security:
"Progressive" Price Indexing and Middle-Class Benefit Cuts (Feb. 2005),
http://www.ncpssm.org/news/archive/vp-priceindex/. ("Over time, all workers would
receive essentially the same poverty-level flat benefit, thus converting the current earnings-
based program into a welfare payment, and seriously undermining public support for Social
Security in the future.").
80 Bethell, supra note 69, at 4.
81 See DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 7, at 80. Robert Ball, in contrast, believes that
solvency should be restored by relying solely on revenue increases. See Ball, supra note 7, at
7-8.
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provided wage-related benefits since its inception and I believe that is one of
the strengths of the program.
Although I would not necessarily object to progressive price indexing for a
limited period of time, I do not see a principled time or way in which to limit
progressive price indexing. One could decide to adopt it for a certain number of
years-say, five, ten, or twenty. But the time period would seem to be wholly
arbitrary.
To the extent that one should reduce benefits for higher wage workers,
there is a much cleaner, more principled way to do so: establish a fourth bend
point. For example, if the maximum taxable wage base were increased as
discussed in Section V.A, it would be possible to amend the benefit formula to
provide that less than 15% (say 7%, perhaps) of AIME between the old
maximum taxable wage base and the new maximum taxable wage base be
replaced. Gradually introducing the new maximum taxable wage base with the
new bend point would minimize the disparity of treatment among cohorts.
82
IV. GENERAL REVENUE AND/OR ESTATE TAX FINANCING
Currently, the Social Security Trust Fund83 is funded principally by
dedicated payroll taxes. Specifically, in 2005, net paroll taxes accounted for
84% of the Social Security Trust Fund's income. 8 Interest on the Social
Security Trust Fund's surplus accounted for 14% of the Trust Fund's income,
86
and revenue from federal income tax imposed on certain Social Security
benefits accounted for two percent of the Trust Fund's income.
87
In recent years, commentators88 and lawmakers 89 have suggested that
additional general revenues and/or estate tax revenue be transferred to the
Social Security Trust Fund. 90
82 For a discussion of the "notch" baby problem affecting those "people who reached
retirement age just after 1977" and for whom benefits were ten percent lower than the
benefits of individuals "who reached retirement just before," see AARON & REISCHAUER,
supra note 7, at 83-84.
83 For these purposes, the term "Social Security Trust Fund" refers to the Old Age
Survivors Insurance Trust Fund. The percentages for the Disability Insurance Trust Fund are
similar though not identical.
84 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a), 3101(a), 311 l(a) (2000).
85 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
86 id.
87 Id. at 5.
88 See, e.g., Ball, supra note 7, at 2 (recommending that beginning in 2010, the estate
tax be dedicated to funding Social Security); ALTMAN, supra note 7, at 299-301 (endorsing
Ball's proposal); Richard Kogan & Robert Greenstein, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities,
President Portrays Social Security Shortfall as Enormous, But His Tax Cuts and Drug
Benefit Will Cost at Least Five Times as Much (Feb. 11, 2005), http://cbpp.org/1-4-
05socsec.pdf ("the cost of the 2001 and 2005 tax cuts, if made permanent, is 1.95 percent of
GDP - or $11.1 trillion - over the same period, or triple the size of the Social Security
shortfall"); Hans Riemer, Chairman, 2030 Ctr., Prepared Testimony Before the President's
Commission to Strengthen Social Security (Oct. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.csss.gov/meetings/Reimer-Testimony.pdf ("Redirecting general revenues that
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Financing Social Security with additional general revenues and/or estate
tax revenue could have a significant impact on the public's perception of Social
Security as an "earned right." The creators of the Social Security program
chose to finance Social Security benefits with "contributions" or payroll taxes
91
because they believed that payroll tax financing would give workers a "right"
to benefits and garner long-term support for the system.92 Indeed, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt told a reporter:
Those taxes were never a problem of economics. They are politics all the
way through. We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the
contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions
and their unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn
politician can ever scrap my social security program.
93
are projected to go to the recently enacted tax cut to Social Security would go a long way
towards closing Social Security's project shortfall" and is a better option to strengthen Social
Security for future generations than private accounts.); See also William H. Gates Sr. &
Chuck Collins, Tax the Wealthy: Why America Needs the Estate Tax, AM. PROSPECT, June
17, 2002, at 21 ("Congress should explore the possibility of linking estate tax revenue to the
Social Security trust fund, providing long-term solvency for the fund without increasing
payroll taxes or reducing retiree benefits.") Cf Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary
Returns: A Fresh Start for the US. Tax System, 112 YALE L. J. 261, 272 (2002) ("Down the
road, some use of general revenues to fund income and health care for retirees seems
inevitable. And if the alternative is an increase in payroll taxes paid by low- and moderate-
income families, turning to general revenues also seems right.")
89 In 1999, President Clinton proposed to make annual general revenue contributions to
the Social Security Trust Fund beginning in 2011 as the Social Security surplus was used to
draw down the public debt. See BALL, supra note 27, at 230 ("For the years 2011 through
2016, the contribution would be the estimated amount of interest saved in those years on the
publicly held debt because of reduction made in the debt beginning in the year 2000 as the
growing Social Security surpluses were used to buy back debt from the public. From 2016
on, the amount of the annual payment would be fixed at the 2016 level. The payments would
end with 2044, the estimated exhaustion date (as of 1999) for the non-Social Security budget
surplus."). See also H.R. 5179, 108th Cong. § 4 (2004) (providing for retention of estate tax
and transfer of revenue from that tax to Social Security Trust Fund).
90 In addition, proponents of partial privatization often propose that the transition costs
of partial privatization be financed with general revenue. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO
STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 10, at 23.
91 Under the Social Security Act as originally enacted, Social Security benefits were
not directly funded with payroll taxes. In order to avoid a constitutional challenge to the
Social Security program,
Title II of the Social Security Act created "an account in the Treasury of the United
States to be known as the 'Old-Age Reserve Account."' Title VIII of the Social
Security Act imposed taxes on employers and employees. These taxes were paid into
the general fund. But the legislation went on to authorize an annual appropriation from
the general fund to the Old-Age Reserve Account in the exact amount of the proceeds
from the Title VIII tax.
ALTMAN, supra note 7, at 82-83. In 1939, however, the Social Security Act was amended to
provide for direct funding of Social Security benefits with payroll contributions. See Social
Security Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 201, 53 Stat. 1360, 1362 (1939). See
also 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
92 See Moore, Misguided Reform, supra note 32, at 141 n.63.
93 See id. at 141 n.64 and authorities cited therein. Cf Milton Friedman, Payroll Taxes,
No; General Revenues, Yes, in THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 25, 28 (Michael J. Boskin
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This section begins by providing an overview of the financing debate. It
then turns to Ball's proposal to earmark the estate tax for Social Security. It
discusses the arguments that have been advanced in favor of and against repeal
of the estate tax and whether estate tax revenue should be earmarked for Social
Security. Finally, it concludes with my recommendation as to whether Social
Security should be financed with more general revenues and/or estate tax
revenue.
A. Overview of the Financing Debate
As discussed in Section II.C above, Social Security's long-term deficit is
due in large part to what Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag refer to as the
system's "legacy cost" or "legacy debt." The original architects of the Social
Security system, the Committee on Economic Security ("CES"), recommended
that this legacy cost be financed by general revenues beginning in 1965. 94
President Roosevelt, however, objected to general revenue financing and
advised Frances Perkins, chair of the CES, that he could not support the
program with general revenue financing. 95 He insisted that the provision be
removed from the report before it was submitted to Congress "and the report
[be] rewritten so that the CES recommendation concerning tax rates and benefit
schedules be presented as simply one possible approach that Congress might or
might not adopt., 96 Robert Myers has speculated that Roosevelt rejected
general revenue financing: "in view of the public criticisms of his unbalanced
budgets (not very large, even relatively, in light of the current situation!) and
his desire not to be criticized for proposing legislation with built-in large
federal subsidies for long-distant future years. ' 9
ed., 1977) ("The imaginative packaging has served a very important political function: it has
made the public at large willing to pay much heavier taxes than they otherwise would have
been willing to bear; it has made them willing to accept a capricious system of benefits and
to support a mammoth bureaucracy that could never have arisen separately. The ultimate
effect has been to foster the growth of government and, above all, of central government.").
94 See BALL, supra note 27, at 211, quoting COMM. ON ECON. SEC., REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 31-32 (1935), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces5.html ("The
allowance of larger annuities than are warranted by their contributions and the matching
contributions of their employers to the workers who are brought into the system at the outset,
will involve a cost to the Federal Government which payments are begun immediately will
total approximately $500,000,000 per year. Under the plan suggested, however, no payments
will actually be made to the Federal Government until 1965, and will, of course, be greater
than they would be if paid as incurred, by the amount of the compound interest on the above
sum.").
95 See ALTMAN, supra note 7, at 60.
96 Id. at 61.
97 ROBERT J. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 496 (4th ed. 1993). Nancy Altman has noted
that a member of the CES, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, objected to the
provision of general revenues and speculates that President Roosevelt may have been
influenced by Morgenthau. ALTMAN, supra note 7, at 60-61 ("It is lost to history whether
Roosevelt truly discovered the deficit himself by a perusal of various tables appended to the
report, as he claimed and as contemporaneous accounts state, or whether Morgenthau,
despite his assurances to Perkins not to object, nevertheless raised his concern privately with
the president.").
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Congress concurred in the President's judgment that the system should not be
financed with general revenues, and the system, as originally enacted, was
designed to accumulate a large reserve and be financed solely with payroll
taxes. In 1938, the Advisory Council on Social Security recommended that
funding of the Social Security program be shifted from a reserve system to a
pay-as-you-go basis so that benefits for the first generation of retirees and their
families could be expanded. The Advisory Council further recommended that
the enhanced benefits be financed with general revenue transfers. 99 The
Advisory Council warned:
The planning of the old-age insurance program must take full account of
the fact that, while disbursements for benefits are relatively small in the
early years of the program, far larger total disbursements are inevitable in
the future. No benefits should be promised or implied which cannot be
safely financed not only in the early years of the program but when
workers now young will be old.
100
In 1939, Congress converted Social Security to a largely pay-as-you-go system
to increase the benefits for early retirees and their families but declined to
introduce general revenue financing.' 0 1 Commentators and Congress have
debated the proper role for general revenue financing since then. 102
Like the CES and the early Social Security Advisory Councils,' °3 many
proponents of general revenue financing contend it is more appropriate to fund
Social Security's redistributive elements,104 including its transfers to the early
generations of Social Security beneficiaries, by a more redistributive tax than
the payroll tax. 0 5 Critics of the current system respond that rather than funding
98 ALTMAN, supra note 7, at 82; Edward D. Berkowitz, The Historical Development of
Social Security in the United States, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 22, 24-25
(Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz eds., 1997).
99 MYERS, supra note 97, at 496.
100 FINAL REPORT OF THE 1937-1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY,
reprinted in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF 1935, at 173, 199 (Nat'l
Conference on Soc. Welfare, 50th anniversary ed. 1985).
101 MYERS, supra note 97, at 496.
102 See, e.g., ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 149-51 (1977)
(summarizing debate among commentators in 1976).
103 See MYERS, supra note 97, at 496 (discussing recommendations of 1937-1938 and
1948-1949 Advisory Councils).
104 For a discussion of the ways in which Social Security redistributes income, see, for
example, Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under the Current Social Security System, 61 U.
PITT. L. REv. 955 (2000); see also C. EUGENE STEUERLE & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING
SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY: RIGHT & WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM 91-132
(1994).
105 Cf Wendell Primus, Director of Income Security, Ctr. on Budget & Policy
Priorities, Statement at the Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging on
Infusing Money into Social Security (Mar. 1, 1999), available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-1-
99socsec.htm ("Compensating Social Security on a one-time, temporary basis for benefit
payments in excess of payroll contributions ... for the first several generations of Social
Security beneficiaries" supports use of general revenue contributions); BALL, supra note 27,
at 230 ("Some have argued that the cost of modifying the equity principle of quid pro quo to
carry out a social purpose-the weighted benefit formula, for example-ought to be carried
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Social Security's redistributive elements with general revenues, Social Security
should be divested of its redistributive elements and benefits should be based
purely on individual equity.106
Critics of general revenue financing often object because general revenue
financing would weaken the link between benefits and taxes. 1°7 Some contend
that weakening the link between benefits and taxes would reduce the system's
inherent fiscal discipline and fear that the system would grow unchecked if
general revenue financing played too great a role in financing benefits.l"8 Other
critics of general revenue financing fear the opposite result-that general
revenue financing might erode public support for the program by drawing it
by the general taxpayer, not solely by the better-off contributors."); U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN.,
REPORT OF THE 1994-1996 ADvISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, VOL. II: REPORTS OF
THE TECHNICAL PANELS ON TRENDS AND ISSUES IN RETIREMENT SAVINGS 87 (1997), available
at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/adcouncil/tirsl.wpd ("The use of general revenues
rather than the payroll tax has certain attractive features. It is administratively simple and is
potentially more redistributive within generations than is an increase in the payroll tax.").
106 U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 105, at 87 ("There are also analysts who argue
that the redistributional component of Social Security should be explicitly identified and
recognized, and funded from the same sources used for other public programs."); MUNNELL,
supra note 102, at 150 ("Those opposing the use of general revenues.., were not persuaded
by the argument for the use of general revenues to finance the social adequacy components
of the program, since they felt that the program should be divested of its welfare function
and be based on individual equity.").
107 Cf AARON & REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 109 (some "would argue that general
revenue financing would weaken the program's social insurance rationale through which
payroll tax contributions create an 'earned right' to benefits"). In contrast, one critic of the
current system supports general revenue financing precisely because it would "help to
dissolve the public belief, so carefully and dishonestly fostered by the social security
bureaucracy, that social security is an insurance system." Friedman, supra note 93, at 28.
108 See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Statement at the: Hearing
Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging on General Revenue Transfers for Social
Security and Medicare (Mar. 27, 2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/testimony/2000/20000327.htm ("when payroll taxes are no longer projected to be
sufficient to pay even currently legislated benefits, moving toward a system of general
revenue financing raises the concern that the fiscal discipline of the current social security
system could be reduced."); STEUERLE & BAKIJA, supra note 104, at 171 ("If payroll taxes
are not raised to cover future Social Security deficits, should the system rely even more
heavily on general revenue financing? Probably not. Such shifts would make even weaker
the tie between benefits and taxes - a tie that at least provides some fiscal discipline to the
program. A hybrid financing system that relies partly on earmarked payroll taxes and partly
on general revenues gives a misleading impression of the amount we are actually spending
on programs for the elderly, since people tend to focus only on the earmarked taxes.");
Robert L. Bixby, Executive Director, The Concord Coalition, Statement at the Hearing
Before the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security (Sept. 6, 2001), available
at http://www.concordcoalition.org/issues/socsec/old-doc/0 1 0806csssdtestimony.htm
(contending that general revenue financing "would weaken fiscal discipline within the
system"); MUNNELL, supra note 102, at 150 ("Those opposing the use of general revenues
agreed that there would be more of a tendency to expand the program without the
'countervailing constituency' created by the payroll tax. However, they felt that further
increases in social security benefits should have a low priority and saw more pressing needs
for general revenues.")
2007]
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
more explicitly into annual budget debates.10 9 Proponents respond that the
Social Security system is "mature enough to withstand an infusion of general
revenues without undermining its basic principles."
1 1 0
Currently, general revenues play a limited role in financing Social Security
benefits. Specifically, since 1983 up to 50% of the Social Security benefits is
subject to income tax,111 and the revenue from that tax is transferred to the
Social Security Trust Fund.1 12 In 2005, that revenue accounted for 2% of the
Trust Fund's income." 3
B. Earmarking the Estate Tax
For many years Robert Ball recommended that general revenues be used to
finance Social Security's legacy debt. He later changed his mind because he
just could not see a commissioner of Social Security, as [he] had been,
successfully arguing before Congress for the huge amounts of general
revenue that the accrued liability rationale required. . . . Considering the
great resistance on the part of the public to general taxes, [he] was fearful
that sufficient general revenue would not be voted. On the other hand, the
public generally seemed quite willing to pay a hefty tax earmarked for
109 Cf Greenspan, supra note 108 ("One argument was that using general revenues
would blur the distinction between the social security system, which was viewed as a social
insurance program, and other government spending programs."); U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN.,
supra note 105, at 87 ("On the other hand introducing general revenues to balance the
system would substantially change the nature of Social Security, and it might also eventually
erode public support. The additional use of general revenues would change the public's
perception of Social Security benefits as earned rights, and might further politicize Social
Security by drawing it more explicitly into annual budget debates.")
110 MUNNELL, supra note 102, at 149.
111 Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-2 1, § 86(a)(1), 97 Stat. 65, 80
(1983). Since 1993, up to 85 percent of Social Security benefits are subject to income
taxation. 26 U.S.C. § 86(a)(2)(B) (2000). These additional revenues are dedicated to the
Medicare Trust Fund and not to the Social Security Trust Fund.
112 Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65. General
revenue transfers have also played a limited role in a few other instances. See C. Eugene
Steuerle, Senior Fellow, The Urban Inst., Statement at the Hearing Before the Senate Special
Committee on Aging on General Fund Transfers to Entitlement Programs (Mar. 27, 2000),
available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900250 ("Historically, Social Security has
also had some general revenue infusions to cover the cost of military service wage credits
(1956), transition benefits for those aged 72 and older with fewer than three quarters of
coverage (1966), wage credits for U.S. citizen internees of Japanese ancestry (1972), and for
taxes which would have been collected on deemed post-1956 military service wage credits
(1983)."); AARON & REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 178-79 n.20 (stating that "when minimum
Social Security benefits were eliminated in 1981, they were preserved for those born before
1920 and financed through a general revenue transfer"); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 6, at 37 n.39 ("The 1983 amendments directed the Treasury to make payments to
the OASDI Trust Funds from general revenues for unfunded gratuitous military service
credits for military service after 1939, the value of uncashed benefit checks issued in the past
(including interest), revenues from the income taxation of up to 50 percent of Social Security
benefits paid, and tax credits given for Federal Insurance Contributors [sic] Act and Self-
Employed Contributions Act taxes paid by workers from 1984 through 1989.").
113 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
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Social Security, so [he] and most other experts gave u?1on general
revenue financing and adopted the "self-financed" principle.
In light of the recent enactment of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA),"15 Robert Ball now advocates that the
estate tax be earmarked for Social Security."16 Under EGTRRA, the estate tax
exemption is scheduled to gradually increase from $1 million in 2002 to $3.5
million (or $7 million for a couple) in 2009, and be abolished in 2010. 17
EGTRRA, however, includes a "sunset" clause which causes the entire Act to
expire in 2011.118 Thus, under current law, the estate tax will be revived at its
2000 levels beginning in 2011.119 President Bush, and many Republicans, call
for the permanent abolition of the estate tax beginning no later than 2010.120
Ball proposes freezing the estate tax at the 2009 level and earmarking
the proceeds for Social Security from 2010 on. 121 According to estimates by
Social Security actuaries, earmarking estate tax proceeds for Social Security
would reduce Social Security's long-term deficit by about 0.5 percent of
payroll. 122
The proposal has intrinsic appeal. It requires some members of the earlier
generations of Social Security beneficiaries to use some of their legacies to help
pay for the legacy debt created for the benefit of their generations. Of course, it
is not a perfect fit. First, many of the early retirees have already died and thus
would not be required to use their legacies to pay for the legacy debt. 123 More
importantly, the estate tax, whether it is frozen at the 2009 level (with a $3.5
114 BALL, supra note 27, at 229.
115 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§§ 501-521, 901(a)-(b), 115 Stat. 39, 69-72, 150 (2001).
116 See BALL, supra note 27, at 3; ALTMAN, supra note 7, at 299-301 (endorsing Ball's
proposal). Although not part of their three part plan, Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag also
support using the estate tax to fund a portion of Social Security benefits. DIAMOND &
ORSZAG, supra note 7, at 93-96.
117 Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of2001 §§ 501-521, 115 Stat. at 69-
72.
"' Id. § 901(a), 115 Stat. at 150.
"9 Id. § 901(b), 115 Stat. at 150. Virtually everyone expects some sort of change in the
estate tax between now and 2011. The question is what form it will take. Cf DIAMOND &
ORSZAG, supra note 7, at 94.
120 Leonard E. Burman et al., Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Ctr., Options to Reform the
Estate Tax 1 (Mar. 2005), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/
311153_IssuesOptions I 0.pdf ("The president [sic] and many members of Congress would
like to repeal the [estate] tax permanently, and many would like to do so before 2010.")
121 See Ball, supra note 7, at 3; ALTMAN, supra note 7, at 299-301 (endorsing Ball's
proposal).
122 Ball, supra note 7, at 4; Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss, Chief Actuary, U.S.
Soc. Sec. Admin., to Robert M. Ball, Estimated OASDI Financial Effects for a Proposal
With Six Provisions That Would Improve Social Security Financing (Apr. 14, 2005),
available at www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency/RBall_20050414.html.
123 Cf Moore, supra note 22, § 5.02, at 9-10 (noting that Ida May Fuller, the first
recipient of monthly Social Security benefits, died in 1975 at age 100).
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million exemption for individuals or $7 million exemption for couples) 124 or
returned to the 2000 level, 125 would only affect a tiny percentage of Social
Security beneficiaries. Nevertheless, there is something appealing about using
legacies to pay for a legacy debt.
Ball's proposal naturally raises two questions: (1) should the estate tax be
permanently repealed?, and (2) if not, should the revenue from the estate tax be
earmarked for Social Security?
1. Should the Estate Tax Be Repealed?
The estate tax is a remarkably unpopular tax. Although it only affects a
very small percentage of the population, 12most Americans object to the tax.
27
Michael Graetz believes this anomaly may be due to the unflappable optimism
of most Americans: most people must believe that they will be among the one
to two percent richest in the nation when they die. 128 Yet, surprisingly,
according to a survey by the U.S. Trust, more than half of the affluent (defined
as Americans in the top one percent of income and thus most likely to be
affected by the estate tax) believe that the federal estate tax should not be
repealed, but that it should be continued at the rate of 18%.129
124 Cf Gene Sperling et al., Ctr. for Am. Progress, Repeal/Reform of the Estate Tax
(June 30, 2005), http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/cap%20estate%20tax.pdf (noting that
by 2009, less than 0.3% of estates will owe any estate tax).
125 See infra Section IV.B. 1 (noting that two percent or less of US decedent population
generally affected by estate tax).
126 See Diane Lim Rogers, 'Death Tax' Repeal Unfair to Those Who Owe 'Birth Tax,'
S.F. CHRON., May 31, 2006 (noting that according to the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy
Center's estimates, in 2006, there will only be 12,600 taxable estates-thus a tax will be only
be assessed on '/2 of one percent of all deaths in 2006); Barry W. Johnson & Jacob M.
Mikow, Federal Estate Tax Returns, 1998-2000, IRS STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Spring 2002,
at 133, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/00esart.pdf (noting that an estimated
103,982 Federal estate tax returns were filed for individuals who died in 1998, that the
returns represented 4.4% of all individuals who died that year, and less than half of the
returns reported any tax liability); Barry W. Johnson & Martha Britton Eller, IRS, Federal
Taxation of Inheritance and Wealth Transfers 3, 19 tbl.6 (March 2001), available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=l 12193,00.html (showing percentage of adult deaths
with taxable estate never exceeded eight-six percent between 1934 and 1993, and in most
years was less than two percent),
127 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, 2001 Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the American
College of Tax Counsel: Erwin Griswold's Tax Law-and Ours, 56 TAx LAW. 173, 175
(2002) (noting that according to a Zogby poll, the public favored repeal of the estate tax by a
71-29% margin); Deborah Geier, The Death of the "Death Tax"?: An Introduction, 48
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 653, 653 (2000) ("A [June 2000] Gallup poll, for example, indicated that
60% of those polled favored elimination of the estate tax 'even though only 17% [believed
that] they 'would personally benefit."'); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Straight Talk about the
'Death' Tax: Politics, Economics, and Morality, 89 TAx NOTES 1159, 1159-60 (2000) ("In
surveys conducted in late August and early September, the Pew Research Center reported
that 71 percent of respondents favored 'eliminating the inheritance tax."').
128 Graetz, supra note 127, at 175.
129 A Few Thoughts, BEACON HILL TIMES, July 18, 2006, at 14, available at 2006
WLNR 13326073.
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Whether the estate tax should be repealed has been the subject of major
debate in recent years.' 30 Indeed, as Richard Kaplan has noted, "entire forests
have been decimated in the process."' 3l A comprehensive analysis of the estate
tax 132 goes well beyond the scope of this Article. I will simply try to highlight
some of the principal arguments presented in the debate.
When Congress introduced the estate tax in 1916, it was said to have had
two purposes: (1) to break up concentrations of wealth, 133 and (2) to produce
revenue. 134 In recent years, a third goal or purpose has been attributed to the
estate tax: adding progressivity to the federal tax system.
135
Critics of the estate tax contend that it has done little to break up
concentrations of wealth. 36 Some proponents of the tax concede that it has
130 See, e.g., William G. Gale & Joel Slemrod, Overview, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION I (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001); Edward J. McCaffery et al., Should We
End Life Support for Death Taxes?, 88 TAX NOTES 1373 (2000); Deborah H. Schenk,
Symposium on Wealth Taxes Part I-Foreword, 53 TAX L. REV. 257 (2000); David Shakow
& Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499 (2000); Ventry, Jr.,
supra note 127; Charles Davenport & Jay A. Soled, Enlivening the Death-Tax Death-Talk,
84 TAX NOTES 591 (1999); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer
Taxation, 104 YALE L. J. 283 (1994); John E. Donaldson, The Future of Transfer Taxation:
Repeal, Restructuring and Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 541
(1993); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L. J. 259
(1983).
131 Richard Kaplan, Crowding Out: Estate Tax Reform and the Elder Law Policy
Agenda, 10 ELDER L. J. 15, 20 (2002).
132 "Federal law imposes an integrated set of taxes on estates, gifts, and generation-
skipping transfers." Gale & Slemrod, supra note 130, at 4. Generally, when discussing the
estate tax, most commentators address the gift tax or the entire transfer tax system together.
This Article will simply refer to the estate tax, but much of the discussion is applicable to the
entire transfer tax system.
133 For an exhaustive discussion of why high concentrations of wealth should be broken
up, see James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 828-50
(2001).
134 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The
New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1180 (2006) ("The tax was designed
both to raise revenue and, in the progressive spirit of the times, to break up large
concentrations of wealth."); Jay A. Soled, Reassigning and Assessing the Role of the Gift
Tax, 83 B.U. L. REV. 401, 402-03 (2003) ("There were two purposes that underlay the
passage of this [estate] tax: to raise revenue and to impede the buildup of large wealth
concentrations"); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, "Gifts, Gafts, and Gefis"--The
Income Tax Definition and the Tax Treatment of Private and Charitable "Gifts" and a
Principled Policy for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441, 475
n.125 (2003). ("A major reason for having estate taxes is to reduce large concentrations of
wealth.").
135 Whether this is a recent claim or a long-standing defense is actually subject to
debate. Compare Gale & Slemrod, supra note 130, at 29 ("Progressivity has long been a
principal justification for the estate tax.") with Donaldson, supra note 130, at 541 ("More
recently, the system has been 'justified' for its role or potential in adding an element of
progressivity to the overall federal tax system.").
136 Barbara Redman, Rethinking the Progressive Estate and Gift Tax, 15 AKRON TAX J.
35, 36 (2000); Donaldson, supra note 130, at 541.
20071
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
done little to break up the greatest concentrations of wealth 137 while other
proponents assert that the tax does in fact decrease dynamic wealth
concentration.138 Other proponents of the tax assert that the failure of the tax to
break up large concentrations of wealth is due to lack of political will, which is
"hardly condemnatory of the tax."
' 139
As for producing revenue, critics of the tax note that it only produces a
tiny percentage of total federal tax revenue (about one percent) 14° and may even
cost the federal government more to administer than it collects from the tax.
141
Critics label the tax "voluntary" 142 because so many methods have been
developed to avoid it143 and contend that the extraordinary amount of money
devoted to avoiding the tax, relative to the revenue collected, causes the tax to
impose an unacceptably high social cost. 144 Proponents of the estate tax
concede that it produces a relatively small percentage of total tax revenue but
contend that critics overstate the administrative costs associated with the tax.
145
Moreover, while the estate tax may produce a relatively small percentage of
total tax revenue, it still raises sizeable dollars; 146 by one estimate, permanentlyrepealing the estate tax would cost the nation $800 billion between 2011 and
137 Graetz, supra note 130, at 271.
138 See, e.g., Repetti, supra note 133, at 856-59.
139 Davenport & Soled, supra note 130, at 598.
140 McCaffery, supra note 130, at 301.
141 See, e.g., Redman, supra note 136, at 36; McCaffery, surpa note 130, at 300-04.
For an overview of the debate regarding administrative issues, see Gale & Slemrod, supra
note 130, at 37-43.
142 GEORGE COOPER, A VOLUNTARY TAX? NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOPHISTICATED
ESTATE TAX AVOIDANCE (1979).
143 See, e.g., Richard Schmalbeck, Avoiding Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, in
RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 113, 120-44 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001)
(describing methods for avoiding the estate tax and suggesting these devices may reduce the
aggregate tax base by about one-third). It is worth noting that EGTRRA did not address the
estate tax's many loopholes. See DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 7, at 94.
'44 Johnson & Eller, supra note 126, at 20 ("The annual costs of estate tax avoidance
schemes, including lawyer fees, accountant fees, costs of subscriptions to estate planning
magazines, and opportunity costs of individuals involved in tax avoidance activities, have
been shown to represent a large percentage of the annual receipts from estate and gift
taxes."); Alicia H. Munnell, Wealth Transfer Taxation: The Relative Role for Estate and
Income Taxes, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 19 (asserting that tax avoidance
costs approach billions of dollars each year which is "an inordinately high social cost for a
tax that only yielded $7.7 billion in 1987.").
145 See, e.g., Davenport & Soled, supra note 130, at 618-25. See also Repetti, supra
note 133, at 869-70 (stating that cost to IRS in administering tax appears to be proportional
to revenues generated and noting that with respect to compliance costs, it is difficult to
distinguish between costs incurred to minimize estate taxes and those to provide for orderly
succession of property).
146 Graetz, supra note 127, at 175 ("In 1999, fewer than 50,000 taxable estates
contributed $28 billion to finance the federal government. Estate tax receipts had been
projected to grow to about $40 billion by 2008."); Repetti, supra note 133, at 852-83
(finding estate tax revenue significant relative to income tax revenue collected from low and
moderate income individuals).
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2021.147 Indeed, earmarking the estate tax for Social Security would reduce
about 25% of Social Security's seventy-five year actuarial deficit.
1 48
To the extent that the estate tax is borne by decedents,149 it is undoubtedly
progressive.'1 50 At most, only about four percent of decedents must file an estate
tax return, and only about half of those decedents pay any estate tax. 151 Thus, at
most, only about the richest 2% of the nation's decedents have taxable
estates.1 52 Nevertheless, the desirability of progressive taxes in general, 153 and
estate taxes in particular, 54 has been the subject of considerable debate.
Critics of the estate tax offer at least two other objections to the estate
tax. 55 First, and perhaps foremost, critics of the estate tax argue that it has an
adverse effect on savings and investment and thus on capital formation.
156
147 Gates & Collins, supra note 88. See also Davenport & Soled, supra note 130, at 593
("While not a large percentage of receipts, [transfer taxes] are sufficiently great that
elimination or reduction of them would force some fiscal offset: other taxes would have to
be raised; other taxes could not be cut; borrowing would be greater; or spending would have
to be cut.").
148 DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 7, at 94-95. See also Ball, supra note 7, at 4.
(stating that earmarking estate tax revenues would reduce Social Security's then long-term
deficit of 1.9 percent of payroll (the level at the time of the calculation) to 1.4 percent of
payroll).
149 Even if the estate tax is borne by recipients, it may still be viewed as progressive.
See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 130, at 28-29.
1S0 See Geier, supra note 127, at 654-55 ("[It's undeniable that the estate tax is
extremely progressive for the very reason that it collects tax from fewer than 2% of all
decedents each year."); but see Donaldson, supra note 130, at 544 (arguing that "[tihe
existing transfer tax system simply cannot be justified by reference to its contribution to
progressivity [because it affects such a small percentage of the decedent population]").
151 Gale & Slemrod, supra note 130, at 23.
152 Id. Indeed, under current law with much higher exemptions as few as one-half of
one percent of decedents are expected to pay the estate tax.
153 Compare Walter J. Blum, Revisiting the Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 60
TAXES 16 (1982), and Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 417 (1952), with ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE
WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 20-21, 58, 121-23, 212-17 (1995).
154 Compare Davenport & Soled, supra note 130, at 598 ("Because we believe in
progressivity we think that the contribution the estate tax makes to it is on the whole good"),
and James R. Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, 86 TAX NOTES 1493, 1500-03
(2000) (by increasing tax burden of the wealthy, estate tax contributes to progressivity of
income tax), and Graetz, supra note 130, at 272 (finding that about one-third of the
progressivity in the federal tax system is due to the estate tax), and Gates & Collins, supra
note 88 (describing estate tax as one of most progressive taxes; "taxing dead
multimillionaires is eminently more fair than taxing the not-so-rich living."), with Redman,
supra note 136 (contending that to the extent that bequest or gift is recognition of and
compensation for past services rendered, progressive taxation loses much of its logic), and
McCaffery, supra note 130 (favoring progressive consumption tax but not estate tax).
155 For a response to a third argument against the estate tax, that it constitutes double
taxation, see Ruth Carlitz & Joel Friedman, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Why the
Estate Tax Is Not "Double Taxation" (June 17, 2005), http://www.cbpp.org/6-17-05tax.htm.
156 Graetz, supra note 130, at 278 ("The basic argument is quite straightforward. Our
nation needs more savings if it is to enjoy economic growth. The estate tax is levied on
savings, and taxing such savings will cause people to save less."); Johnson & Eller, supra
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Proponents of the estate tax claim that the economic studies are equivocal and
do not clearly establish that increased savings will result from the elimination
or reduction of estate taxes.
57
In addition, some critics contend that the estate tax hurts small farms and
family-owned businesses.' 58 "To pay the estate tax after the owner dies, the
heirs face a stark choice: sell the machinery and go out of business, or make all
the other kinds of cost-cutting decisions-layoffs, deferring new investment-
that hurt the company's competitiveness."15 9 Proponents of the estate tax
respond that the estate tax should have a minimal impact on most small
businesses because of a number of provisions in the estate tax law, including
the exemption for small estates,1 60 that are intended to provide relief to small
business and farms. 16 1 Proponents concede that the law is complex and
imperfect, but argue that the law should be reformed rather than repealed.
162
note 126, at 3 ("Opponents claim that transfer taxation creates a disincentive to accumulate
capital and, thus, is detrimental to the growth of national productivity."). For an overview of
the debate regarding the estate tax's effects on saving and labor supply, see Gale & Slemrod,
supra note 130, at 43-45.
157 See, e.g., Davenport & Soled, supra note 130, at 608 ("Because of Slemrod's
concern, we suggest an inquiry into whether taxing the very rich has a special effect on the
economy. Short of that inquiry and results from it, no case has been made for the estate tax
having much effect on savings or capital formation."); Repetti, supra note 133, at 858-66
(reviewing theory and empirical studies and finding that most empirical evidence suggests
that estate tax does not decrease savings); Graetz, supra note 130, at 283 ("[o]n balance....
the economic evidence available to date simply fails to make a case for the elimination or
reduction of estate and gift taxes on the grounds that increased savings will result."); see also
Johnson & Eller, supra note 126, at 21 ("There are economists who also reject the postulate
that moderate transfer taxes have an adverse effect on capital accumulation. Embracing an
idea first proposed by the mid-19th century English economist J.R. McCulloch, they argue
that transferors adjust their bequest plans when faced with transfer taxes.").
158 Johnson & Eller, supra note 126, at 20 ("Federal transfer taxes are often cited as
impediments to the livelihood of small businesses and farms."). For an overview of this
debate, see Gale & Slemrod, supra note 130, at 45-50; ROBERT MCCLELLAND, CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX ON FARMS AND SMALL BUSINESSES
(2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/65xx/doc6512/07-06-EstateTax.pdf.
159 John Engler, 'Death Tax'and Folks Who Make Things, AKRON BEACON J., June 8,
2006, at B2, available at 2006 WLNR 9792763.
160 See, e.g., Gale & Slemrod, supra note 130, at 47-49 (describing favorable treatment
of family farms and businesses under pre-EGTRRA law); Repetti, supra note 133, at 866-68
(same).
161 Some contend that the claim that the estate tax harms farms and small businesses is
nothing more than a myth. See Geier, supra note 127, at 655 ("While commentators agree
that there must surely be some farm or small business somewhere that was, indeed, sold to
pay estate taxes, no one seems to have ever been able to find it."); McCaffery et al., supra
note 130, at 1374 ("While there are reports of businesses being sold to pay estate taxes, there
is no work validating this. Some anecdotal information suggests the contrary.").
162 See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 127, at 175; Repetti, supra note 133, at 868-69;
Ventry, supra note 127, at 1168-69.
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2. Earmarking Estate Tax Revenues for Social Security
Whether estate tax revenues should be earmarked for Social Security
raises many of the same issues as using general revenues to fund some portion
of Social Security benefits. For example, using estate tax revenues to fund
some Social Security benefits would weaken the link between benefits and
taxes. Weakening the link between benefits and taxes, however, may not have
the same ramifications when estate tax rather than general revenue financing is
involved. First, one of the objections to general revenue financing is the fear
that the program would grow unchecked if general revenue financing played
too great a role in financing benefits. While the estate tax raises "sizeable
dollars," and earmarking estate tax revenues for Social Security would reduce
Social Security's long-term deficit by 0.5% of payroll, estate tax revenue
represents a very small percentage of total federal tax revenue. Unless the
estate tax were dramatically restructured and increased (which appears
unlikely), the limited amount of estate tax revenue would necessarily keep any
growth in Social Security under check.
A second objection to general revenue financing is that it might erode
public support for the program by drawing it more explicitly into annual budget
debates. Partially financing Social Security benefits with estate tax revenue
would keep Social Security out of the annual budget debate. 163 Instead, it would
draw Social Security explicitly into a debate with the estate tax: one of the most
popular federal programs 164 against an unpopular federal tax. I expect that
Social Security would win that debate. Indeed, Robert Ball recommends estate
tax revenue financing as a way to "save" the estate tax.
165
C. Recommendation
Overall, I find a great deal of merit in Robert Ball's proposal to earmark
estate tax revenue for Social Security. The estate tax may be imperfect and in
need of reform, but it should be retained because of the role it plays in adding
163 DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 7, at 95 ("Moreover, dedicating estate or
inheritance tax revenue to Social Security would support the important tradition of keeping
Social Security out of the annual budget discussion. Given that so many Americans rely so
much on Social Security, its provisions should be adjusted only from time to time, not every
year, and with lead times to help workers adapt.").
164 See, e.g., Jefferson, supra note 18, at 1290 ("Social Security is one of the most
popular and successful social programs in this country's history."); Herman B. Leonard, In
God We Trust-The Political Economy of the Social Security Reserves, in SOCIAL
SECURITY'S LOOMING SURPLUSES: PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS 57, 59 (Carolyn L. Weaver
ed., 1990) (noting Social Security enjoys nearly unassailable political support); Bruce K.
MacLaury, Foreword, in MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESS: THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT vii (1990) (noting Social Security is
no less sacred politically today than in 1979); Felicity Skidmore, Overview of the
Symposium, in SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING 1, 7-8 (Felicity Skidmore ed., 1981) ("That
social security was one of the most popular social programs was accepted without
question.").
165 Ball, supra note 7, at 3.
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progressivity to the federal tax system. Moreover, in light of the progressive
nature of the estate tax, and the fact that one of the reasons Social Security
faces a long-term deficit is because the system redistributed income to the early
generations of Social Security beneficiaries, it seems appropriate to use a
highly progressive tax, rather than the regressive payroll tax, to fund this
redistribution. Although an imperfect fit, using legacies to pay for a legacy debt
is an appealing idea.
Of course, using estate tax revenue to fund some Social Security benefits
would weaken the link between contributions and benefits and could erode
public support for the program. Nevertheless, I believe the program is "mature
enough to withstand an infusion of [estate tax] revenues without undermining
its basic principles."'
' 66
Moreover, estate tax revenue financing is more appealing than increased
general revenue financing. First, given that unified budget deficits are projected
for the foreseeable future, it does not make sense to dedicate general revenues
to Social Security from an unspecified source. 67 Second, to the extent that
earmarking the estate tax for Social Security would "save" a tax that would
otherwise be permanently repealed, earmarking it for Social Security would not
make the problem of reducing the current federal deficit more difficult.
168
V. INCREASING PAYROLL TAXES AND/OR DECREASING BENEFITS
In recent years, policymakers and analysts have recommended a variety of
payroll tax increases and benefit reductions to address Social Security's long-
term deficit. For example, experts have recommended that the maximum
taxable wage base be increased 69 and/or the Social Security tax rate be
increased. 17 They have also recommended that the age at which full benefits
are available (the normal retirement age) be increased, or at least the currently
scheduled increase in the age be accelerated, and/or that benefits be based on
thirty-eight or even forty years of earnings rather than thirty-five years as under
current law. 172 This section will discuss two of the most common proposals in
more detail: (1) proposals to increase the maximum taxable wage base, and (2)
proposals to increase the normal retirement age.
166 MUNNELL, supra note 102, at 149.
167 See DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 7, at 94.
168 Id.
169 See infra notes 180-81.
"' See, e.g., S. 1792, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998) (proposing that payroll tax gradually be
increased to 6.7% by 2060); U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 10, at 30 (Personal Security
Account plan proposing a 72-year payroll tax increase of 1.52%).
171 See infra notes 273-75.
172 See AARON & REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 97; S. 1383, 106th Cong. § 204 (1999);
S. 1792, 105th Cong. § 8; U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 10, at 25, 29 (Maintain
Benefits and Individual Account Plans).
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A. Increasing the Maximum Taxable Wage Base
Current law imposes on both employees 73 and employers 74 a tax of 6.2%
of wages, up to a maximum taxable wage base, 175 indexed to the increase in
average wages nationwide and equal to $94,200 in 2006,176 to finance Social
Security benefits. 177 Under current law, the maximum taxable wage base also
serves as a benefits base which establishes the maximum amount of earnings
that are used to calculate benefits. 178 In 2006, the benefit for an individual who
earned the maximum taxable wage for at least thirty-five years (the number of
years on which benefits are based) and retired at the full retirement age (sixty-
five years and eight months for workers reaching age sixty-five in 2006), is
equal to $2,053 per month or $24,636 per year.1
79
In recent years, a number of commentators 80 and lawmakers' 8' have
recommended that the taxable wage base be increased to reduce Social
Security's long-term deficit. This section begins with a brief history of the
maximum taxable wage base. It then describes some of the leading proposals to
increase the taxable wage base. It then analyzes the costs and benefits of
increasing the taxable wage base. Finally, it concludes with my
recommendation as to whether the maximum taxable wage base should be
increased.
1. History of Social Security Maximum Taxable Wage Base
As originally drafted, the Roosevelt Administration's proposal did not
include a maximum taxable wage base. Rather, in its original proposal,
President Franklin Roosevelt's Committee on Economic Security excluded
173 26 U.S.C. § 3 101(a) (2000).
174 26 U.S.C. § 3111 (a) (2000).
"' 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 430(a) (2000).
176 Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2006, 70 Fed. Reg. at 61,677
(Oct. 25, 2005) (announcing 2006 taxable wage base).
177 The self-employed are required to pay similar taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2000).
178 42 U.S.C. § 430 (2000).
179 U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Fact Sheet: 2006 Social Security Changes, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2006.pdf.
180 See, e.g., Ball, supra note 7, at ; ALTMAN, supra note 7, at 301-03; Christian E.
Weller, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Restore Tax Fairness for Social Security's Solvency (May
2005), http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/restore-tax fairness.pdf, DIAMOND & ORSZAG,
supra note 7, at 84-85; Riemer, supra note 88; Timothy M. Smeeding, Carroll L. Estes &
Lou Glasse, Social Security in the 21st Century: More Than Deficits: Strengthening Social
Security for Women 5, http://www.geron.org/journals/income.htm ("Increasing the earnings
base to the intended level is an attractive alternative to benefit cuts alone and should be
considered as part of any well-rounded reform package.").
181 See, e.g., H.R. 440, 109th Cong. § 12 (2005) (gradually raising base to $142,500 in
2010 and then indexing it to eighty-seven percent of total payroll thereafter); H.R. 3821,
108th Cong. § 12 (2004) (gradually raising base to $133,200 in 2008, and indexing it to
eighty-seven percent of total payroll thereafter); S. 1383, 106th Cong. § 205 (1999) (setting
taxable wage base at eighty-six percent of total payroll); S. 2774, 106th Cong. § 205 (2000)
(setting taxable wage base at 84.5% of total payroll).
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from coverage non-manual workers with monthly wages of $250 or more.182
Presumably, the committee excluded these high wage workers because the
program's drafters were focused on alleviating the poverty a large number of
people faced at the time, and they were not concerned with high-wage
workers. 1
83
The maximum taxable wage base first appeared in a bill reported by the
House Ways and Means Committee.' 84 The Committee replaced the exemption
for high wage workers with a maximum taxable base, which it set at $3,000 per
year (which equals $250 per month). 185 Although the Committee report did not
provide a clear explanation for replacing the high wage exemption with a
taxable wage base, Debra Whitman of the Congressional Research Service
speculates that the Committee may have added the taxable wage base to
promote administrative ease and tax equity.' 86 Excluding high wage workers
could have created administrative difficulties for workers whose earnings
fluctuated above and below the $250 monthly threshold. In addition, low and
average wage workers may have objected to paying taxes from which high
wage workers were exempt.
When the Social Security program was ultimately enacted in 1935, it
included a maximum taxable wage base set at $3,000. 88When the taxes were
first collected in 1937, the $3,000 threshold taxed 92% of all wages in covered
employment, 189 and 96.9% of covered workers were taxed on all of their
wages; 19 that is, only 3.1% of covered workers had wages that exceeded the
taxable wage base.
182 THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY,
reprinted in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF 1935, at 15, 49 (50th
anniversary ed. 1985).
183 DEBRA WHITMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOCIAL SECURITY: RAISING OR
ELIMINATING THE TAXABLE EARNINGS BASE 1 (2005), available at
http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL32896_20050502.pdf ("Being in the midst of the Depression,
the Administration's attention was on the large number of aged people living in poverty....
Not concerned about high-income retirees, the Administration's proposal exempted non-
manual workers earning $250 or more a month from coverage (i.e., $3,000 on an annual
basis). Manual workers were to be covered regardless of their earnings, but few had earnings
above this level.").
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 2.
187 Id. ("The committee's report and floor statements made at the time give no clear
record as to the reasoning for the taxable limit, but concerns about tax equity and attaining as
much program coverage of the workforce as possible were suggested as factors for rejecting
the high-earner exemption. Not covering them meant that they would not pay the tax where
lower wage eamers would, and coverage would be erratic for workers whose earnings
fluctuated above and below the $250 monthly threshold.").
188 Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 811 (a), 49 Stat. 620, 639 (1935).
189 U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 36, at 4.12 tbl.4.B1.
'90 Id. at 4.18 tbl.4.B4.
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The maximum taxable wage base was increased on an ad hoc basis six
times between 1935 and 1972.191 Then, in 1972, Congress amended the Social
Security program so that the benefit formula (including the taxable wage and
benefit base) was indexed to adjust automatically to changes in the cost of
living.
192
In light of the rampant inflation at the time, the indexing formula turned
out to be flawed, 193 and Congress amended the formula in 1977.194 In addition,
because the Social Security program faced both short-term and long-time
financing difficulties at that time, Congress enacted four separate increases in
the maximum taxable wage base to help address the system's deficit. 95 The
increases were designed so that the taxable wage base would cover 90% of all
wages by 1982.196 The House Ways and Means Committee Report explains,
Your committee's bill provides for increasing the contribution and
benefit base-in four steps-to a level where about 90 percent of all
payroll in covered employment would be taxable for social security
purposes (and about 93 percent of all workers would have their full
earnings credited for benefit purposes). When the social security program
began in 1937, about 92.5 percent of all payroll in covered employment
was covered, and about 97 percent of the workers in covered employment
had their full earnings counted for benefit purposes. Your committee
believes that it would be desirable to move toward taxing a higher
proportion of total payroll in covered employment than the 85 percent
that is now taxable.
Moreover, "[a]s a result of the automatic adjustment," it was expected that
"the proportion of total payroll covered by the base [would] be eliminated at a
constant level over the long run."' 9 8 That prediction, however, has not turned
out to be true. Due in large part to the fact that salaries for top earners grew
faster than for lower wage workers, 199 the share of earnings subject to the tax
has decreased from 90% of all earnings in 1982 to just under 85% in 2004,200
191 See 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 125 (showing that contribution base was
increased to $3,600 in 1951, $4,200 in 1955, $4,800 in 1959, $6,600 in 1966, $7,800 in
1968, $9,000 in 1972).
192 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-336, § 202, 86 Stat. 412, 493-
503.
193 See AARON & REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 83.
194 Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 201, 91 Stat. 1509,
1514.
195 These changes were contained in Title I of the Act, entitled "Provisions relating to
the Financing of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program." Social Security
Amendments of 1977 § 101, 91 Stat. at 1509-10.
196 Social Security Amendments of 1977 § 103, 91 Stat. at 1513 (increasing the base to
$17,700 in 1978, $22,900 in 1979, $25,900 in 1980, and $29,700 in 1981).
"' H.R. REP. No. 95-702, pt. 1, at 18 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4155,
4175.
198 Id.
199 WHITMAN, supra note 183, at 3.
200 U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 36, at 4.12-4.13 tbl.4.B1.
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and is expected to further decrease to 83% of all earnings by 2015201 and
remain stable thereafter.202 On the other hand, the share of workers who have
income that exceeds the taxable wage base has remained at a relatively constant
5 or 6% since the 1980s. 20 3
2. Proposals to Increase the Taxable Wage Base
In recent years, commentators and lawmakers have proposed that the
taxable wage base be increased. For example, Robert Ball has proposed that in
addition to the automatic annual increases in the maximum taxable wage under
current law, the maximum taxable wage base (for purposes of both taxes and
benefits) be gradually increased until the base covers 90% of all wages paid to
covered employees. (A wage base that covers 90% of wages would be about
$150,000 in 2005.205). Specifically, he proposes that the maximum taxable
wage base be increased by 2% each year (in addition to the currently scheduled
automatic increases due to the growth in average wages) until the base reaches
90% of taxable payroll.206 Under his proposed approach, it would take about
forty years to reach the 90% level.20 7
Similarly, Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag have recommended a gradual
increase in the taxable wage base until it reaches 87% of payroll. Specifically,
under their proposal, "starting in 2005, the maximum taxable earnings base
would increase by 0.5 percentage point more than the percent increase in
average wages each year, until 87% of covered earnings are subject to payroll
taxation in 2063 and later."
20 8
3. Costs and Benefits of Increasing the Taxable Wage Base
a. Reducing the Long-Term Deficit
The most obvious benefit of increasing the taxable wage base is its
potential to reduce Social Security's long-term deficit. How much it would
reduce the long-term deficit would depend on how the increase were
structured.20 9 According to Social Security Administration projections in 2003,
if the taxable wage base were eliminated both for purposes of determining
earnings subject to payroll taxes and for purposes of crediting earnings in
determining benefits, the long-range actuarial deficit would be reduced from
the then-deficit of 1.92% of taxable payroll to 0.22% of taxable payroll. 210 If
201 See Reno & Lavery, supra note 6, at 3.
202 WHITMAN, supra note 183, at 5.
203 Id at 3.
204 Ball, supra note 7, at 2; ALTMAN, supra note 7, at 302 (describing and endorsing
Ball proposal).
205 WHITMAN, supra note 183, at 6.
206 Ball, supra note 7, at 2. ALTMAN, supra note 7, at 302.
207 Ball, supra note 7, at 2.
208 DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 7, at 86.
209 See Reno & Lavery, supra note 6, at 10 (showing how three different options could
reduce the deficit from forty percent to more than one hundred percent).
210 Memorandum from Alice H. Wade, Deputy Chief Actuary, & Chris Chaplain,
Actuary, Soc. Sec. Admin., to Steve C. Goss, Chief Actuary, Soc. Sec. Admin., Estimated
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the taxable wage base were eliminated for purposes of determining earnings
subject to payroll taxes but not for purposes of crediting earnings in
determining benefits, the long-range deficit would be entirely eliminated and
the actuarial balance would be a positive 0.25% of taxable payroll. 211 The
reason that the second proposal would result in a greater reduction in the long-
range actuarial deficit than would the first is that under the first proposal,
workers with earnings above the current taxable wage base would be entitled to
higher benefits as well as being required to pay higher taxes while under the
second proposal, workers with earnings above the current taxable wage base
would be required to 2ay higher taxes but their benefits would remain the same
as under current law.
If the taxable wage base were increased but not eliminated, it would still
reduce the deficit but not by as much. For example, according to Social
Security Administration projections, Robert Ball's proposal to gradually
increase the taxable wage base over a forty year period would reduce the long-
range actuarial deficit from its then level of 1.9% of payroll to 1.3% of
payroll.213 If the maximum taxable wage base were increased faster, it would
reduce even more of the system's long-range actuarial deficit. 214 The
Diamond/Orszag proposal to gradually increase the taxable wage is projected to
reduce Social Security's actuarial imbalance by 0.25% of payroll.
215
Opponents of proposals to increase the taxable wage base do not deny that
increasing the taxable wage base would reduce Social Security's long-term
actuarial deficit. They contend, however, that reducing the system's long-term
actuarial deficit is essentially meaningless2 16 because adding money to Social
Security's trust fund "does nothing to change Social Security's actual
solvency. ' 217 Rather, they contend that "[a] far better measure of Social
Security's finances and the impact of changes such as raising the tax cap is the
annual cash-flow surplus or deficit, that is, the yearly gap between Social
Security's revenue and expenditures." 218 If the taxable wage base were
Long-Range OASDI Financial Effects of Eliminating the OASDI Contribution and Benefit
Base (Oct. 20, 2003), available at http://www.centristpolicynetwork.org/legislativeupdates/
files/OACTtaxmax.pdf (based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2003 Social Security
Trustees Report).
211 id.
212 Id. at 2.
213 Ball, supra note 7, at 2; Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss, supra note 122.
214 Ball, supra note 7, at 2 (noting that implementing the change over 10 years rather
than 40 years would reduce the deficit by. 1% of payroll rather than .6% of payroll).
215 DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 7, at 86.
216 See, e.g., Tanner, supra note 20, at 5 ("[T]hose claims [that removing the wage cap
would reduce Social Security's long-term deficit] are based on a fundamental fallacy: the
assumption that Social Security surpluses accumulated today can be saved through the Social
Security Trust Fund.").
217 Id. at 6.
218 Tanner, supra note 20, at 6. See also Concord Coalition, Raising the Social Security
Taxable Earnings Cap: Real Reform or Another Placebo? 5 (July 6, 2005),
http://www.concordcoalition.org/issues/socsec/issue-briefs/SSBrief9--Tax-Cap.pdf ("What
matters most to the economy and budget is not the 75-year aggregate impact on the trust
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increased as Ball has proposed, the Social Security system would begin to runS- 219
cash-flow deficits in 2021, just four years after the system is projected to run
cash-flow deficits under current law. 2°If the cap were eliminated for both tax
and benefit purposes, the system would begin to run cash-flow deficits in
2024,221 and if the cap were eliminated for tax purposes but no additional
benefits were paid, the system would begin to run cash-flow deficits in 2025.222
Thus, opponents argue that increasing the taxable wage base would increase
taxes substantially with little offsetting benefit.
223
b. Addressing Earnings Inequality
Proponents of increasing the taxable wage base often point to the growing
inequality of wages in the United States 22 and suggest that increasing the
taxable wage base would be a way to restore fundamental fairness to the Social
Security system.225 Opponents of increasing the taxable wage base do not
dispute that over the last twenty years "earnings have risen most rapidly [for
workers] at the top of the earnings distribution, that is, among those workers
who already were receiving the highest earnings., 226 Instead, opponents of
increasing the taxable wage base note that historically the share of earnings
subject to the Social Security tax has varied widely, ranging from a low of
71.3% in 1965 to a high of 92.4% in 1940, 227 with the percentage below 85%
more than half the years the Social Security tax has been in effect.228 Critics of
funds of raising the tax cap but how much it would reduce Social Security's annual cash
deficits as they emerge and grow over time."); Matt Moore, Nat'l Ctr. for Policy Analysis,
Eliminating the Social Security Payroll Tax Cap: A Bad Idea (Mar. 23, 2004),
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba470/ba470.pdf.
2 19 Tanner, supra note 20, at 7.
220 See 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
221 Concord Coalition, supra note 218, at 5.
222 Id. at 5.
223 Tanner, supra note 20, at 9; Concord Coalition, supra note 218, at 5-6 ("As the
table shows, even the most extreme of the three measures (eliminating the cap without
crediting additional earnings) would not generate enough revenues to cover the future Social
Security cash deficits."); Moore, supra note 218, at 2 ("While eliminating the Social Security
payroll tax cap would reduce the funding gap somewhat, it has only a marginal effect and
comes with a huge economic cost.").
224 See, e.g., Ball, supra note 7, at 2; Weller, supra note 180, at 3; DIAMOND & ORSZAG,
supra note 7, at 84-85.
225 Primus, supra note 105 ("Taxing a higher level of earnings is justified not only
because earnings at high levels have been increasing faster than average earnings, but also
because cash earnings are becoming a smaller proportion of total compensation."); Weller,
supra note 180, at 2 ("Raising or eliminating the cap would restore tax fairness for Social
Security"); Riemer, supra note 88 ("Raising the payroll tax cap so that high earners pay
Social Security taxes on more or all of their income, like the rest of us, would also help
[strengthen Social Security for future generations].") (emphasis added).
226 DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 7, at 64.
227 U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 36, at 4.12.
228 Concord Coalition, supra note 218, at 3. See also Gareth G. Davis & D. Mark
Wilson, Heritage Found., The Impact of Removing Social Security's Tax Cap on Wages 3-4
(Jan. 19, 1999), http://www.heritage.org/Research/SocialSecurity/CDA99-01.efn; Tanner,
supra note 20, at 2.
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increasing the taxable wage base contend that there is no normatively
appropriate level to set the maximum taxable wage base and thus the wage base
need not be increased to address increasing earnings inequality.
229
c. Impact on Workers and the Economy
Proponents of increasing the taxable wage base contend that it would only
affect the highest-paid 6% of workers, and if gradually phased in over time,
could significantly reduce Social Security long-term deficit with little• • 230
noticeable pain. Under current law, employers are required to collect the
employee's share of the Social Security tax from the employee's wages as and
when the wages are paid. 23 1 For employees who earn less than the taxable wage
base, Social Security taxes are collected throughout the year. For the 6% or so
of workers whose wages exceed the taxable wage base, Social Security taxes
are collected each pay period until wages reach the taxable wage base. For the
remaining weeks or months of the year (depending on the employee's total
wages), no Social Security taxes are collected from the employee's wages.
Thus, under Ball's proposal to gradually increase the taxable wage base by 2%
per year over the currently scheduled increases until the base reaches 90% of
wages, "deductions from earnings for the highest-paid 6 percent of workers
would simply continue for a few days longer into the year .... Such a gradual
adjustment would be virtually painless ... ,,232
Opponents of increasing the taxable wage base, in contrast, assert that
"[i]n the end, proposals for changing the taxable wage cap are all pain and no
gain." 233 Critics ignore the possibility of gradually increasing the wage base to
90% or even just 87% of taxable wages as Robert Ball as well as Peter
Diamond and Peter Orszag have proposed. Instead, they focus on proposals to
immediately eliminate the taxable wage base and decry such a change as
constituting "the largest tax increase in American history-some $461 billion
over the first five years alone."
234
Again, focusing solely on the possibility of immediately eliminating the
wage cap,235 critics contend that such a change would harm the economy in at
229 Concord Coalition, supra note 218, at 3; see also Tanner, supra note 20, at 2.
230 Ball, supra note 7, at 2.
231 26 C.F.R. § 31.3102-1 (2006).
232 Ball, supra note 7, at 2, Diamond and Orszag would also phase in their "reform over
an extended period to allow workers time to adjust to the change." DIAMOND & ORSZAG,
supra note 7, at 86.
233 Tanner, supra note 20, at 1.
234 See Moore, supra note 218, at 2. See also Tanner, supra note 20, at 4 (claiming that
elimination of wage cap would result in $472 billion tax increase); Concord Coalition, supra
note 218, at 6 (asserting that elimination of wage cap would amount to more than $1.3
trillion in new taxes over next ten years); Davis & Wilson, supra note 228, at 5
("[E]liminating the Social Security taxable wage cap would: [riesult in the largest tax
increase in the history of the United States-$425.2 billion in nominal dollars over five
years," or $367 billion in 1998 inflation-adjusted dollars.).
235 Cf Rea S. Hederman, Jr. et al., Heritage Found., Keep the Social Security Wage
Cap: Nearly a Million Jobs Hang in the Balance 2 n.8 (Apr. 20, 2005), http://
www.heritage.org/Research/SocialSecurity/cda05-04.cfm. ("The same number (and type) of
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least two ways. First, they contend that eliminating the taxable wage base
would reduce the incentive to work by increasing the marginal tax rate on
labor. 236 "Should Social Security's tax cap be removed, many workers will
immediately find that federal taxes alone consume almost 55 cents of every
additional dollar they earn from employment." 237 In addition, critics contend
that increasing the taxable wage base would reduce national savings because
the tax increase would reduce the after-tax income of those workers who are
238most able to save.
Relying principally on intuition for their arguments, 239 critics have little
hard data to support their position that increasing the taxable wage base would
harm the economy. 24 Indeed, Michael Tanner of the Cato Institute concedes
that "there has been relatively little analysis of the economic consequences of
... eliminating the payroll tax cap." 24 1 He relies on work by Edward Prescott,
the 2004 Nobel Prize winner in economics, that compares work effort in high-
tax societies in Europe with the United States to support his supposition that "it
seems fair to assume that [the economic consequences of raising the payroll tax
cap] would be considerable.
'" 242
A 2005 study by analysts with the conservative Heritage Foundation found
that eliminating the taxable wage base would decrease the rate of economic
growth by 0.4 percentage points in 2005 and 0.2 percentage points in 2006, and
the unemployment rate would average about 0.3 percentage points higher from
workers would be affected by either an increase in or the outright elimination of the taxable
wage cap. Only the magnitude of the tax increase and its impact on family budgets and the
economy would differ.").
236 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 218, at 2 ("[i]ncreasing the marginal tax rate will have
adverse economic consequences."); Press Release, Sen. Jon Kyl, We Can't Tax Our Way
Out of the Social Security Crisis (Feb. 8, 2005), available at http://kyl.senate.gov/
record.cfm?id=231656. ("Moreover, increasing or eliminating the wage cap would stunt the
growth of the entire national economy."); Davis & Wilson, supra note 228, at 5 ("An
increase in the marginal tax rate on labor income would damage the economy by reducing
the incentive to work.").
237 Davis & Wilson, supra note 228, at 5.
238 See, e.g., Tanner, supra note 20, at 5; Davis & Wilson, supra note 228, at 8. Indeed,
Davis and Wilson contend that increasing the taxable wage base would also reduce
charitable contributions by reducing the after-tax income of the workers who contribute the
most to charity. Davis & Wilson, supra note 228, at 8-9 ("removing the maximum taxable
wage cap would reduce charitable contributions by $15.5 billion ... from 2000 to 2004, or
1.9 percent of all charitable giving over the same period.").
239 See, e.g., Concord Coalition, supra note 218, at 7 ("Workers may not sit around
calculating their after-tax return from each additional hour of work, but at some point they
do notice. Older workers certainly do as they weigh the consequences of continuing to work
or retiring.").
240 See Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Budget Magic and the Social Security
Tax Cap, TAx NOTES TODAY, Mar. 15, 2005, available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT 49-8.
("Because additional work effort would generate less after-tax income, there is concern that
labor supplied to the economy would shrink. Of course, the amount of that reduction is
unknown and is the subject of vigorous debate.").
241 Tanner, supra note 20, at 5.
242 Id.
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2006 to 2015.243 Christian Weller, an economist with the Center for American
Progress, however, has criticized that study because:
it assumes that the tax increases are spread out across all taxpayers and
not just over the 5.4 percent of individuals earning more than [the taxable
wage base]. Because the effect would be limited to a small share of
taxpayers, the employment effects would likely be much smaller than
estimated.
244
4. Recommendation
I recommend that the taxable wage base be gradually increased, either to
87% of taxable payroll as Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag propose, or to 90%
of taxable payroll as Robert Ball proposes. In addition, I recommend, as these
experts propose, that the benefit base be increased in conjunction with the wage
base so as to retain the link between contributions and benefits.
The first, and most important, reason for increasing the taxable wage base
is that it would reduce Social Security's long-term actuarial deficit. While
critics of increasing the taxable wage base are right that in many ways Social
Security's annual cash-flow position is more important than its long-term
deficit, reducing the long-term deficit is not meaningless. 2 4 5 Moreover,
gradually increasing the taxable wage base would in fact improve the system's
annual cash flow position by increasing tax receipts, particularly in later years
when the system will be in the greatest need of increased revenues.
Second, increasing the taxable wage base makes sense in light of the
growing inequality of wages in the United States. The legislative history of the
taxable wage base shows that there is no single, normatively accurate level for
the taxable wage. 24 6 Nevertheless, 87% to 90% of wages seems reasonable. I do
not, however, believe that the wage base should be entirely eliminated.
Eliminating the wage base runs the risk of either politically unacceptably high
benefits if the benefit base were simultaneously increased 2 4 7 or an
unprecedented, and potentially politically damaging, break between
contributions and benefits if the benefit base were not increased. 2 4 8 As
discussed in Section III-E, however, I would not object to introducing a fourth
243 Hederman et al., supra note 235, at 8.
244 Weller, supra note 180, at 8.
245 Cf Alicia H. Munnell, Ctr. for Retirement Research at Boston Coll., Are the Social
Security Trust Funds Meaningful? (May 2005), http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/dummy/
issues/ib30.pdf (explaining that accumulating a surplus in the Social Security trust funds is
meaningful if it results in increased national savings).
246 Congress explicitly selected 90 percent as the level in 1977, but it did not offer any
normative justification for the 90 percent. See H.R. REP. No. 95-702, pt. 1, at 18 (1977),
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4155, 4175.
247 WHITMAN, supra note 183, at 10 ("eliminating the base would raise public cynicism
about a publicly financed system that pays enormous benefits to people who already are well
off").
248 Reno & Lavery, supra note 6, at 3 ("Ever since Social Security began, the level of
wages that are taxed has been linked to the level of wages that count toward benefits. This
proposal would break that link.").
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bend point and providing that contributions above the current taxable wage
base be replaced at lower rate than the current 15%.
I agree with the critics that increasing the taxable wage base would not be
entirely painless, particularly for the 6% or so of workers who would be
required to pay increased taxes. That, however, does not mean that the proposal
should be rejected. There is simply no entirely painless way to address Social
Security's long-term deficit. Gradually increasing the base over a long period
of time should help to minimize the pain for these individuals. Moreover, while
it is possible that gradually increasing the taxable wage base and thus
increasing the marginal tax rate on labor would decrease work effort, it is
unlikely to have a very significant impact. Under Ball's proposal to gradually
increase the taxable wage base, Social Security taxes would simply be
collected, at most, for an additional week each year.249 It is hard to imagine that
such a variation in take-home pay would have a significant impact on work
effort. I do not believe that the risk of reduced labor supply outweighs the
benefit of reducing Social Security's long-term deficit.
B. Increasing the Normal Retirement Age
Under current law, a retired worker is entitled to receive full benefits at her
"normal retirement age" or "NRA., 250 The NRA is sixty-five for workers who
reached sixty-two before 2000 and is scheduled to increase gradually to sixty-
seven by the year 2022.25 1 Specifically, in 2000, it began to increase two
months each year until it reached age sixty-six for workers who reached age
252sixty-two in 2005. In 2017, it will again increase two months each year until
it reaches age sixty-seven for workers who reach age sixty-two in 2022 and
after.253 A worker may elect to receive actuarially reduced benefits as early as
age sixty-two. 254 This age is usually referred to as the "earliest eligibility age"
or "EEA.
'255
In recent years, a number of policymakers and commentators have
recommended that the currently scheduled increase in the NRA be accelerated
and/or that the NRA be further increased. This section begins with a brief
history of the Social Security retirement ages. It then describes some of the
proposals to increase the NRA. It then analyzes the costs and benefits of
increasing the NRA. Finally, it concludes with my recommendation as to
whether the NRA should be increased.
249 See ALTMAN, supra note 7, at 302 ("Those earning at or above the maximum
taxable wage base would have the same tax rate provided under present law deducted from
wages a bit longer in the year--one additional week a year, at most.").
250 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2000).
251 42 U.S.C. § 416(1) (2000).
252 42 U.S.C. § 416(1)(3)(A).
253 42 U.S.C. § 416(1)(3)(B).
254 42 U.S.C. § 402(q).
255 See Kathryn L. Moore, Raising the Social Security Retirement Ages: Weighing the
Costs and Benefits, 33 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 543, 545 n.12 (2001).
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1. History of the Social Security Retirement Ages
When the Social Security program was originally enacted, sixty-five was
256
the earliest age at which benefits could be elected. The legislative history of
the Social Security Act shows that this age was not based on any scientific,
social, or gerontological study. 257 Rather, it was chosen as a result of general
258
consensus that sixty-five was the most acceptable age.
In 1956, Congress lowered the age at which all women beneficiaries could
begin to collect benefits.259 Specifically, it provided that all women
beneficiaries could begin to collect benefits as early as age sixty-two, but
required an actuarial reduction in benefits for working women and wives who
elected to receive benefits before age sixty-five. 2 6 A number of justifications
were given for making benefits available before age sixty-five, including the
fact that wives are typically a few years younger than their husbands and that
women who are widowed a few years before age sixty-five often have
difficulties finding jobs. 26 1 In 1961, Congress amended Social Security to
permit men to begin to collect reduced benefits as early as age sixty-two.
26 2
Although women had been permitted to receive benefits at age sixty-two since
1956, equity was not the prime motivation for this change.2 6 3 Rather, the
principal justification for introducing the EEA for men was that it would help
older workers who have a difficult time finding a new job when they lose their
job.
264
256 Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 202(a), 49 Stat. 620, 623 (1935).
257 Moore, supra note 255, at 547-48.
258 id.
259 Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, § 102, 70 Stat. 807, 809-10.
260 id.
261 Moore, supra note 255, at 549-51.
262 Social Security Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, § 102, 75 Stat. 131, 131.
263 As originally enacted, a different, less favorable, formula was used to calculate
benefits for men who retired early than for women who retired early. Specifically, men's
eligibility and benefits were based on earnings through age 65 while women's eligibility and
benefits were based on earnings through age 62. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub.
L. No. 98-21, § 201, 97 Stat. 65, 109-18. Congress adopted the less favorable formula for
men in order to permit the law to be changed without imposing any additional cost on the
Social Security Trust Fund. In 1972, Congress amended Social Security to base men's
eligibility and benefits on earnings through age 62. Although costly (an estimated $6 million
in additional benefits the first year), the amendment was designed to equalize the treatment
between men and women. See Moore, supra note 255, at 553-54. Similarly, during the
1970s, a number of Supreme Court cases called for equality in treatment between men and
women beneficiaries. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (widowed
fathers); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (widowers); Califano v. Silbowitz, 430
U.S. 924 (1977), aff'g Silbowitz v. Califano, 397 F. Supp. 862 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (husbands).
The Social Security Act was also amended a few times in the 1970s and 1980s to equalize
the treatment between men and women beneficiaries. See, e.g., Social Security Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 104, 86 Stat. 1329, 1340; Social Security Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 334, 91 Stat. 1509, 1544; Social Security Amendments of 1983
§§ 301-310, 97 Stat. at 109-18.
264 Moore, supra note 255, at 552-53.
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In 1983, Congress amended the Social Security program to provide for a
deferred, gradual increase in the NRA. 26 5 That provision, introduced by
Representative Pickle, was intended to address Social Security's long-term
deficit. 266 In introducing the provision, Pickle insisted that an increase in the
NRA was inevitable due to increased longevity and demographic changes early
in the 21st century. 267 He noted that his proposal offered the additional
advantage of implementing the change over a long period of time and thus
permitting workers to adjust to the change. 26
8
2. Proposals to Accelerate the Currently Scheduled Increase in the Normal
Retirement Age or Increase It Even Further
Since the Social Security system was enacted, life expectancy has
increased. When Social Security first began to pay benefits in 1940, life
expectancy at age 65 was 11.9 years for men and 13.4 years for women. 269 By
2005, life expectancy at age 65 had increased to 16.3 years for men and 19.0
270years for women. Moreover, the Social Security Trustees predict that by
2025, 65-year-old men will have a life expectancy of 17.6 years while 65-year-
old women will have a life expectancy of 20.0 years, and by 2080, 65-year-old
men will have a life expectancy of 20.5 years while 65-year-old women will
271have a life expectancy of 22.8 years. Increasing life expectancy contributes
to Social Security's long-term deficit because Social Security pays benefits for
life, and any increase in life expectancy at the age at which benefits begins
necessarily increases Social Security's costs, unless, of course, there is an
offsetting reduction in benefits.
272
In light of the role that increasing life expectancy plays in Social
Security's long-term deficit, in recent years, a number of policymakers and
commentators have recommended that the currently scheduled increase in the
NRA be accelerated and/or that the NRA be further increased.273 For example,
265 Social Security Amendments of 1983 § 201, 97 Stat. at 107-08.
266 Moore, supra note 255, at 555.
267 id.
268 Id.
269 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 81 tbl.V.A.3.
270 Id.
271 Id. (using intermediate assumptions). For a critique of the Trustees' assumption and
an argument that life expectancy may level off or even decrease in the first half of the
twenty-first century, see S. J. Olshansky et al., A Potential Decline in Life Expectancy in the
United States in the 21st Century, 352 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1138 (2005).
272 See DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 7, at 58-64 (explaining in detail how
increasing life expectancy contributes to Social Security's long-term deficit).
273 See, e.g., Robert J. Myers, Is the Only Way to Save Social Security to Destroy It?,
BENEFITS Q., 3d Quarter 1997, at 40, 44 (recommending that NRA be increased by two
months each year beginning in 2003 until it reaches 70 in 2037); COMM. FOR ECON. DEV.,
FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY: A STATEMENT BY THE RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 39 (1997), http://www.ced.org/docs/
report/report socsec.pdf; COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY: A STATEMENT
BY THE RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
39 (1997), available at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report-socsec.pdf (recommending
gradually increasing the NRA to 70 by 2030); Social Security Solvency Act of 1998, S.
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Henry Aaron and Robert Reischauer have recommended that the NRA be
increased to sixty-seven by 2011 and that it thereafter be adjusted to increases
in life expectancy. 274 Similarly, a majority of the members of 1994-1996 Social
Security Advisory Council recommended that the currently scheduled increase
in the NRA be accelerated and that the NRA be increased in conjunction with
increases in life expectancy thereafter.
2 75
3. The Costs and Benefits of Increasing the Normal Retirement Age
As with any change, there are costs and benefits associated with increasing
the NRA. The most obvious benefit of accelerating the currently scheduled
increase in the NRA and/or increasing it even further is that it would reduce
Social Security's long-term deficit. 26According to 2005 projections by the
Congressional Budget Office, eliminating the current hiatus and phasing in the
increase in the NRA to sixty-seven between 2006 and 2011 would reduce
Social Security's long-term deficit by 0.14% of taxable payroll.2 77 Eliminating
the hiatus and further increasing the NRA to sixty-eight by 2017 would reduce
the long-term deficit by 0.58% of taxable payroll.2  Finally, eliminating the
hiatus and further increasing the NRA to 70 by 2029 would reduce the long-
279term deficit by 1.19% of taxable payroll.
The most obvious cost of increasing the NRA is that it would constitute a
reduction in Social Security benefits. If the NRA were increased and no
adjustment were made to the EEA, workers could either (1) retire later (that is,
begin to collect benefits at a later age) and receive the same level of benefits for
fewer years, or (2) begin to collect benefits at the same age and receive lower
benefits for the same number of years. 28 If the EEA were also increased,
workers' choices would be limited to receiving the same level of benefits for
fewer years. 28 1 Either way, an increase in the NRA is almost economically
identical to an across-the-board reduction in retirement benefits.
282
Increasing the NRA also raises some more subtle costs and benefits.
Proponents contend that such a change, particularly if accompanied by an
increase in the EEA, would promote general economic gains by encouraging
older workers to remain in the work force longer and thus increase national
productivity. 283 In a detailed study of this claim, 284 I found that the weight of
1792, 105th Cong. § 9 (1998); Twenty-First Century Retirement Plan, S. 1383, 106th Cong.
§ 209 (1999).
274 AARON & REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 97.
275 U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 10, at 21.
276 This assumes that any such change would be accompanied by an actuarially fair
adjustment to benefits claimed before and after the NRA. See Moore, supra note 255, at 561
n.107.
277 Cong. Budget Office, supra note 6, at 4-5 tbl.l.
278 Id. (element 3.2).
279 Id. (element 3.3).
280 See Moore, supra note 255, at 563.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 562-63.
283 Id. at 567.
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evidence supports this proposition because (1) such a change should encourage
workers to extend their working lives and thus increase the supply of older
workers; (2) most, though not all, older workers should be healthy enough to
extend their working lives; and (3) the demand for older workers is likely to
285
increase as the baby boom generation ages.
On the other hand, increasing the NRA, without a concurrent increase in
the EEA, could dramatically increase the risk that older workers and their
dependents end their lives in poverty. Currently, about half of all retired
workers elect to begin collecting benefits at the EEA.286 If the NRA were
increased, and many workers continued to begin collecting benefits at the EEA,
those workers could face dramatically reduced benefits. Under current law,
workers' benefits are reduced by 5/9 of one percent for each month that a
worker retires before the NRA, or 6.67% for each year of early retirement.
287
Once the NRA reaches age sixty-seven, a worker who retires at age sixty-two
will receive a 30% reduction in monthly benefit payments.288 If the NRA were
increased to seventy, and benefits continued to be actuarially reduced under the
same schedule, a worker who retired at age sixty-two would receive a 45%
reduction in monthly benefit payments. 289 Increasing the EEA in conjunction
with any further increase in the NRA could eliminate the risk that workers
would elect to receive dramatically reduced early retirement benefits. It would
not, however, eliminate the risk of poverty faced by individuals who are unable
to work until the new, higher EEA, unless another source of income were
available to them.
290
Critics of increasing the NRA also point out that such an increase is likely
to have a disproportionately adverse effect on older individuals with poor
health, individuals with lower life expectancies, and individuals who rely
disproportionately on Social Security for their retirement income. 29 1 Most
likely to be included in these vulnerable populations are blue collar workers,
lower income workers, blacks, and to some extent, Hispanics.292 The current
Social Security Disability Insurance program 293 and Supplemental Security
Income program 294 may provide benefits that soften the impact for some of
284 Id. at 565-90.
285 Id. at 590-91.
286 U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 36, at 6.16-6.17 tbl.6.135 (showing that in 2004,
49 percent of male and 54.1 percent of female new retired worker beneficiaries elected to
receive benefits at age 62).
287 42 U.S.C. § 402(q)(1)(A) (2000).
288 Moore, supra note 255, at 592-93.
289 Id. at 593.
290 See id. at 593-99.
291 See, e.g., Christian E. Weller, Econ. Policy Inst., Raising the Retirement Age: The
Wrong Direction for Social Security 3-5 (Sept. 2000), http://www.epinet.org/
briefingpapers/raisingretirement/raising-retirement.pdf.
292 Id.; Moore, supra note 255, at 599.
293 42 U.S.C. § 421 (2000).
294 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (2000).
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these vulnerable individuals, but these benefits are unlikely to eliminate all of
the adverse impact.
295
4. Recommendation
Overall, I support an increase in the Social Security NRA. The first, and
foremost, justification for increasing the NRA is that it would help reduce
Social Security's long-term deficit. In addition, it could help promote economic
gains.
Nevertheless, increasing the NRA would not be costless. It is essentially
economically equivalent to an across-the-board benefit cut that would reduce
all workers' benefits. Moreover, it would likely have a disproportionately
adverse impact on certain workers, particularly blue-collar workers, lower
income workers, blacks, and to some extent, Hispanics.
In order to minimize the adverse effects of increasing the NRA, I believe
that the EEA should be increased in conjunction with any increase in the NRA
to prevent workers from voluntarily electing drastically reduced early
retirement benefits. In addition, consideration should be given to modifying the
Social Security Disability Insurance program and the Supplemental Security
Income program to ensure that workers who are unable to work beyond age
sixty-two for health or other reasons have a safety net on which they can rely.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Social Security reform has fallen from center stage in recent
months, it is not dead. 296 The Social Security Trustees' long-term projections
297make it clear that the system must be reformed. The only questions are how
and when.
Solving Social Security's long-term deficit requires that taxes be
increased, benefits reduced, or some combination of the two.298 I believe
295 Moore, supra note 255, at 599-608.
296 Indeed, when signing the Pension Protection Act of 2006 into law on August 17,
2006, President Bush said that he and Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson would continue to
push Congress to enact Social Security reform. Bush declared, "Now is the time to move;
now is the time to do our duty." Sheila R. Cherry & Brett Ferguson, President Signs Pension
Reform Bill; Urges Congress to Reform Entitlements, 33 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP.
1985 (2006). See also Nancy Ognanovich, Bush Says Social Security Plans Back on Front
Burner After Election, 33 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 2451 (2006) (noting that
"President Bush said Oct. 11 he plans to revive his proposals to restructure Social Security
programs after the November congressional elections").
297 Although virtually all lawmakers and commentators agree that the system must be
reformed, a defender of the system might point to the Social Security's trustees' projections
based on their low cost estimates to contend that the system does not need to be reformed.
See 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 51-52 (noting that the "program would be able
to cover cost for the foreseeable future under the more optimistic low cost assumptions.").
See also id. at 6 (noting that Trustees use three sets of assumptions in their projections and
that the intermediate assumptions reflect their best estimates of future experience).
298 Proponents of the current system have offered proposals, such as extending
coverage to all new state and local workers and investing part of the trust fund assets in the
private market that would not require increasing taxes on currently covered workers or
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comprehensive Social Security reform should consist of a combination of the
two so that no single class of participants or beneficiaries bears the entire brunt
of reform.
Among the changes I recommend are earmarking estate taxes for Social
Security, increasing the maximum taxable wage base until it covers 87 to 90%
of taxable payroll, and increasing the NRA. The first two changes, earmarking
the estate tax for Social Security and increasing the maximum taxable wage
base, would have a disproportionately adverse effect on the wealthiest and
highest paid, while increasing the NRA would likely have a disproportionately
adverse effect on blue-collar workers, lower-income workers, blacks, and to
some extent, Hispanics. If the NRA is increased, the Social Security Disability
Insurance and Supplement Security Income programs should be modified to
ensure that those who need it would have a safety net on which to rely.
I object to the creation of individual accounts; they would do little to
nothing to solve Social Security's long-term funding deficit and they would
convert Social Security from a system of social insurance to a system of
ownership and control. I also object to progressive price indexing; if
implemented for a long enough period of time, progressive price indexing
would convert the current system of wage-related benefits to a flat benefit
system.
reducing benefits. Such changes, however, are unlikely alone to eliminate all of Social
Security's currently estimated long-term deficit of 2.02 percent of taxable payroll. See, e.g.,
ALTMAN, supra note 7, at 304 & 307 (contending that diversifying the Social Security trust
fund portfolio to include investments in a broadly diversified indexed equity fund or funds
would reduce Social Security's long-term deficit by 0.37 percent of taxable payroll while
extending Social Security coverage to all new state and local employees hired on or after
January 1, 2010 would save .19 percent of taxable payroll).
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